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Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have become a key element in national strategies of 
technologically advanced countries, as they  perceive that their economic performance 
growingly depends on their capacity to exploit the outputs of their creative and 
innovative activities. In an increasingly globalized market, a key element in those 
countries’ strategies is to ensure the international protection of IPRs. Less 
technologically advanced countries approach IPRs from a different perspective. They 
fear that IPRs will perpetuate the current technological superiority of developed  
countries and retard their own development. In fact, advanced countries have succeeded 
in substantially strengthening the international rules on IPRs, especially with the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement as one of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round of 
GATT. 
 
This paper examines, first, the historical evolution and internationalization of 
intellectual property regimes since the end on the XIXth Century. Second, it address the 
main analytical issues raised by the IPRs regime. It elaborates on the nature of 
knowledge as a public good and the static and dynamic effects of introducing 
exclusionary rights, particularly for follow-on innovation and for countries with 
different levels of social and economic development. Third, the paper discusses the 
room left to governments in the context of the emerging international IPRs system for 
the adoption of industrial and technological policies suitable to their own conditions and 
capacities, particularly for the acquisition and absorption of foreign technologies. The 
final section considers how different international organizations interact in this field  
and the ongoing debates on the development dimension of IPRs. 
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1. Internationalization of intellectual property 
 
Historically, IPRs emerged in response to local needs1 and were conceived as an 
essentially territorial right, that is, a right limited to the jurisdiction where it was granted 
or otherwise recognized. IPRs regimes, hence, significantly varied among countries as 
governments tried to support the development of their industries or protect them from 
foreign competition. The search of regimes adapted to  their national interests was 
eloquently expressed by the Swiss Federal Councillor Brenner during the Parliament’s 
debates about the patent law: In our deliberations on this law, we would do well to bear 
in mind that it should be framed in such a way that it is adapted to the needs of our own 
industries and conditions in our own country. These considerations, rather than the 
demands and claims of foreign industries, must be our primary concern in shaping the 
law’2. Switzerland, by way of example, did not introduce patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products till well advanced the XXth Century since it feared the 
superiority of German firms in those fields. 
 
The internationalization of the IPRs system started at the end of the XIX and Century 
with the adoption of two major conventions (see below) and continued during the XXth 
Century with different intensity, The process was driven by a small group of 
technologically advanced countries that actively sought to induce the adoption of the 
same level of protection in  other countries to prevent imitation of their creations and 
innovations.   
 
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement represented a major step in the 
internationalization of the IPRs system, as all WTO members are bound to comply with 
                                                 
1 Historians have found precedents of intellectual property protection in the Middle Ages. 
Ancestors of the modern trade marks were already in use in the XIIth and XIIIth Centuries (see, 
e.g. C.D.G. Pickering (1998), Trade Marks in Theory and Practice, London: Hart Publishing, p. 
37). The Republic of Venice adopted the first patent law in 1474. Patents later became rule-
governed ‘privileges’ conferred at the discretion of  monarchs until the modern patent laws 
substituted the concept of ‘right’ to an invention for that of a discretionary privilege (aee, e.g., 
Vidaurreta, Guillermo E. Historia del sistema argentino de patentes de invención (1580 – 1863). 
Propiedad intelectual en la Constitución Nacional, Facultad de Derecho de la UBA- CEIDIE y 
Editorial La Ley S.A., Buenos Aires, 2006). 
2 Quoted in Richard Gerster (2001) Patents and Development : Lessons Learnt from the 
Economic History of Switzerland, Intellectual Property Rights Series #4, Third World Network, 
Penang, p. 10.  
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the minimum standards the Agreement sets forth in the main areas of IPRs protection3. 
Unlike the previous conventions on IPRs, the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement 
may be enforced through the dispute settlement system of the WTO. This was one of 
the main strategic reasons for developed countries to opt for the GATT forum for the 
negotiation of IPRs rules. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement put an end to the significant leeway that countries had to design 
their national IPRs regimes under the international conventions established between the 
end of the XIX Century and the 1980’s. When today’s industrialized countries were in 
their process of development, they effectively enjoyed a lot of flexibility to shape their 
IPR systems.  
 
For instance, between 1790 and 1836, as a net importer of technology, the USA 
restricted the issue of patents to its own citizens and residents.  Even in 1836, patent 
fees for foreigners were fixed at ten times the rate for US citizens. Netherlands 
abolished patent protection in 1869, thereby allowing Philips to start its production of 
light bulbs without infringing Edison’s patents4, while Switzerland’s most important 
industries, chemicals and textiles, flourished in the 19th century in the absence of patent 
protection. In many European countries (France, Germany, Switzerland) that are now 
proponents of strong patent protection, pharmaceutical product patents were only 
recognized after the 1960s. Portugal, Spain and the Nordic countries waited until the 
1990’s. All this was possible because at the time there were no binding international 
rules imposing minimum standards of IP protection as is the case nowadays. 
 
Under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property contracting parties 
were permitted to exclude patent protection in certain sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, 
determine the duration of patent rights, limit the exclusive rights conferred and grant 
compulsory licenses for a variety of reasons, including lack of local working of a patent. 
In fact, the most successful cases in recent history of industrial and technological 
development (such as the cases of Japan and South Korea) took place in such a flexible 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Correa, Carlos (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. A 
commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, Oxford Commentaries on the GATT/WTO Agreements, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
4 Ha-Joon Chang (2007), Bad Samaritans : Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the Threat to the 
Developing World, Random House Business Books, p. 132. 
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framework of IPRs protection. More recently, the robust development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, which has become a major world supplier of cheap generic 
medicines and active ingredients, was also possible in the absence of pharmaceutical 
product patents5. 
 
Developed countries also enjoyed a flexible copyright framework in their earlier stages 
of development. British authors, were legally copied in the USA during most of the 
nineteenth Century. Foreign authors did not receive copyright protection until 1891. 
Charles Dickens toured the USA in 1842 pleading for international copyright. He 
published in 1843 the ‘American Notes’, where he expressed his frustration with US 
law. Fifty thousand pirated copies were sold in only three days in the USA. His A 
Christmas Carol sold at that time for the equivalent of $ 2,50 in London, and for six 
cents a copy in the USA6. The arguments articulated then against copyright protection 
of foreign works could well be applied in poor countries today: a) expanding literacy 
demanded cheap yet excellent books; b)there was no inherent property right in 
literature; c) granting copyright to foreigners would give them a monopoly at the 
expense of US reading public; d) US publishers and their employees needed the de facto 
advantage afforded by the absence of protection7. 
 
The flexible IPRs regime applied during the XIXth and most of the XXth Centuries 
came to an end with the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO. Hence, much 
of the flexibility that developed countries enjoyed to design their IPR system is not 
longer available to developing countries8. surprisingly, the Agreement has benefited 
those countries and industries with greater capacity to generate new knowledge and 
information. The TRIPS Agreement represented, in particular, a major victory for the 
pharmaceutical industry9, which worked hard to expand the patent protection of 
pharmaceutical products, excluded from patentability in most developing countries and 
                                                 
5 See, eg., S Chaudhuri (2005), The WTO and India’s pharmaceuticals industry. Patent 
protection, TRIPS and Developing countries, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
6 See  S Vaidhyanathan (2001), Copyrights and copywrongs. The rise of intellectual property 
and how in threatens creativity, New York University Press, New York, p. 50-51. 
7 S Vaidhyanathan (2001),Copyrights and copywrongs. The rise of intellectual property and how 
in threatens creativity, New York University Press, New York, p. 50-51. 
8 See, e.g. CIPR, Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy , London, 2002. 
9 Ed Pratt Jr, CEO Pfizer (1972-91) was reported to say:  ‘The current GATT victory, which 
established provisions for intellectual property, resulted in part from the hard-fought efforts of 
the US government and US businesses, including Pfizer, over the past three decades. We’ve 
been in it from the beginning, taking a leadership role’.  
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in some developing countries at the time the TRIPS negotiations were launched in the 
Uruguay Round10. An early study by McCalman concluded that the implementation of 
patents under the TRIPS Agreement  
 
has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries, with 
the US being the major beneficiary…These transfers significantly alter the 
perceived distribution of benefits from the Uruguay Round, with the US benefits 
substantially enhanced, while those of developing countries and Canada 
considerably diminished. Furthermore, accounting for the increase in dead 
weight loss from higher standards of patent protection undermines the aggregate 
benefits of the Uruguay Round package, with the increase in dead weight loss 
amounting to as much as one fifth of the efficiency gains from trade 
liberalization11. 
 
McCalman’s findings have been amply confirmed by more recent statistics. Although there is 
no conclusive evidence of an increase in the flows of production technologies to developing 
countries, there has been an impressive rise in global royalty payments. They grew from 61 
billion dollars in 1998 to 120 billion in 2004, the United States being the main beneficiary 
thereof 12.   
 
 
2. Justification and role of IPRs 
 
The granting of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has been justified on three different 
grounds.  
 
                                                 
10 More than fifty countries did not recognize patent protection for pharmaceuticals at that time. 
See UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement ant Developing Countries, Geneva, 1996. 
11 McCalman, Phillip (1999), Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International 
Patent Harmonization, available at http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/showdoc.html?id=5075, 
p. 30. 
 
12 Based on World Development Indicators (2000 and 2006). US receipts for royalty and license 




In accordance with a natural rights-based approach (proprietarianism) IPRs are a type 
of property that -as any other property- pre-exist the States which simply recognize, do 
not create them, as a matter of natural justice.  This approach is based on the idea 
(generally attributed to Locke) that a person who is first connected to an object with 
economic value is entitled to appropriate it. There are different variants of this theory or 
creed, including theological and non theological versions.  
 
Under a second approach (distributive justice), IPRs do not pre-exist the State but their 
grant would result from a moral imperative. The society would be morally obligated to 
reward those who disclose new creations or inventions. This approach shares with the 
natural rights theory a strong individualistic bias. 
 
A third approach (instrumentalism) views IPRs as an instrument that society has created 
to attain certain objectives. The realization of social goals is what justifies the 
interference with the liberties of others through the establishment of exclusive rights. 
IPRs are not conferred for moral reasons but for very practical purposes. This approach 
is enshrined in many national constitutions. For instance, article I, Section 8° (8) of the 
US constitution states that  
 
the Congress shall have the power… To promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries. 
 
An important consideration under an instrumentalist approach is that knowledge, by its 
very nature is a non-rival public good13. Non-rival goods have the property that they can 
be available for public use, usually at modest costs, and sometimes even at zero cost. 
Though non-rival in nature, knowledge is excludable by action of its possessor or 
through the enforcement of IPRs, which artificially create scarcity of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Stiglitz, Joseph, (1999), Knowledge as a global public good”, in Kaul, Inged; 
Grunberg, Isabelle and Stern, Marc, (Eds.), Global public Goods. International Cooperation in 
the 21 ST Century, New York, p. 309. 
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Under the instrumentalist approach, the purpose of IP is not to ensure an individual or 
corporate gain but to benefit society by encouraging inventions and creations14. In other 
words, scientific and technological progress is achieved through the work of inventors 
and creators15.  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents Co.v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, p. 511 (1917) " the primary purpose of our 
patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of  patents but is to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts ...". Similarly, in relation to copyright, 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. that “the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labour of 
authors, but to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’16. 
 
An instrumentalist approach, if properly applied, should permit countries to design their 
IPRs policies in accordance with their own conditions and objectives. As the World 
Bank has noted, in the area of IP countries may need to adopt different modalities and 
levels of IPRS, as “one size does not fit all”17. However, in pursuing their own interests, 
developed countries have induced in various ways developing countries to adopt 
standards of IPRs protection that in many cases are not suitable to the conditions 
prevailing there, particularly as IPRs may affect access to the outcomes of innovation by 
the poor.  
 
In designing their IP policies, developed countries have essentially aimed at 
encouraging domestic invention and creation. Although any country may potentially 
benefit from inventions and creations made abroad, the costs that IP generate have little 
justification if, as a minimum, access to such inventions or creations is not available or 
affordable for the local  population of the country granting IPRs protection. This 
                                                 
14 See, e.g.,  Carlos Correa (2003), “Formulating effective pro-development national intellectual 
property policies”, in C. Bellmann, G. Dutfield and R. Meléndez-Ortiz (editors), Trading in 
knowledge. Development perspectives on TRIPS, trade and sustainability, Earthscan, London, 
2003. 
 
15 See Peter Drahos, A philosophy of intellectual property, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1996, p. 201. 
 
16 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 U.S. 340, 1991, paragraph 19. 
17 See World Bank (2001), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002, 
Washington, D.C. 
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explains, for instance, why the obligation to industrially work a patent in the country of 
grant was a common feature of patent laws in Europe in the XIXth Century18. 
 
Two general approaches may be applied to understand the role of IPRS in the 
production of information: welfare economics and the neo-Schumpeterian economics19.   
 
Welfare economic examines the role of IPRs in terms of their impact on static and 
dynamic economic efficiency20.  
 
Static efficiency is best served, in general, when a competitive market is in place. 
Competition forces firms to increase productivity of capital and labor and reduces the 
cost of production. In a competitive framework, consumers benefit from greater product 
quantity, quality and variety and, most importantly, firms’ cost savings are passed on to 
consumers by the way of lower prices. Competition may lead to allocative efficiency, as 
the price of a product tends to be equal to the marginal cost of production. While 
producers may obtain a reasonable profit (sufficient to make investment in production 
attractive) there is maximum diffusion of existing products.  
 
Competition can also lead to dynamic efficiency. It can be a powerful incentive to 
introduce product, process or organizational innovations. Many important innovations 
are the result of stiff competition, particularly when different technological options may 
be pursued. Investment for the production of knowledge in a competitive environment, 
however, may be deterred by the risk and high externalities associated with the creation 
of intangibles. Once obtained a new knowledge, it may be easily exploited by others 
who have not contributed to its development. In this situation, appropriation 
mechanisms, such as intellectual property rights (IPRs) may provide the necessary 
incentive to invest in innovation activities. Under the welfare economics approach, 
                                                 
18 As reflected in the 1925 revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property See, e.g., M. Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and 
Compulsory Licences at International Law (1997; 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243). 
19 See on this subject, Benkler, Yochai, (2001), “A political economy of the public domain: 
Markets in information goods versus the marketplace of ideas”,   Dreyfuss, Rochelle; 
Zimmerman, Diane and First, Harry, (Eds.), Expanding the voundaries of intellectual property,  
Oxford University Press, Cheltenham, p. 270-271. 
20 See, e.g. UNCTAD, (1997), Empirical evidence of the benefits from applying competition law 
and policy principles to economic development in order to attain greater efficiency in 
international trade and development, TD/B/COM.2/EM/10, Geneva,  p. 5, 8 and 9. 
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hence, the loss of static efficiency would be set-off against the growth and welfare 
benefits accruing from the future introduction of new products and processes.  
 
This view is largely based on Arrow’s seminal work on the production of knowledge 
and, particularly, on his discussion on patents21. Property rights that allow exclusion of 
competitors permit prices to be raised above the marginal cost. This might be deemed to 
be the cost paid by society for getting innovations. However the right to exclude 
competitors for a certain period leads to a deadweight loss and lowers social welfare in 
the short term, since there is a reduction in the diffusion of innovations, and a limitation 
on the number of consumers that may have access to the outcomes of innovation. As 
noted by David (1992),  
 
“intellectual property inherently entails restricting the extent of useful 
application of the new knowledge by permitting the imposition of license and 
royalty charges upon the users. The more secure is the patent monopolist (even 
though it has been publicly disclosed), the higher the charges that can be levied. 
This reduces the benefits that would have accrued to society at large, and to 
consumers in particular, had the information been made available for 
competitors to exploit in the form of new products or production processes” (p. 
16). 
 
In addition, property rights leads to underutilization of information, including for the 
generation of subsequent innovation. A basic problem is that knowledge is not only 
output but also an input of R&D activities:  
 
“Since every generation is both ‘the first’ to future producers, and ‘the second’ 
to prior producers, the conflict is pervasive and sets limits on the extent to 
which, even in a dynamic analysis, it is efficient to recognize and enforce rights 
in information products. As Arrow put it, ‘precisely to the extent that [property 
                                                 
21 See, e.g. Arrow, Kenneth, (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention”, in National Bureau of Economic Research, The rate and direction of inventive 
activity, Princeton University Press. 
. 
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rights in information are] successful, there is an underutilization of the 
information’”22. 
 
The neo-Schumpeterian approach focuses on the way in which technological knowledge 
is created, accumulated and disseminated in a given market structure, rather than on 
efficiency issues. Schumpeter argued that monopoly power is an important incentive to 
undertaking innovative activity. Anticipated market power in the new products may 
provide essential incentives to innovate, since an enterprise would in most cases be 
impossible if it were not known from the outset that exceptionally favorable situations 
are likely to arise23. 
 
Based on Schumpeter’s insights, Scherer explained -from the perspective of the 
invention-innovation-diffusion sequence- the economic logic of the patent system as 
follows:  
 
“Society desires the superior products and more efficient processes associated 
with technological change. Ideally, it would like to realize all the benefits from a 
given innovation as quickly as possible. This implies swift, widespread imitation 
of the innovation and a rapid decline in prices until production and necessary 
marketing costs are barely covered. But absent governmental or other subsidies, 
inventors and especially innovators are unlikely to bear the costs and  risks of 
developing and introducing a new technology unless they can expect to be 
sheltered from the imitative swarm for a sufficiently long time to recoup or more 
than recoup their early investment…By inhibiting and delaying imitation, patent 
grants prevent the premature erosion of innovators profits and hence instill 
expectations in the minds of would-be innovators and inventors that their efforts 
stand a good chance of being rewarded”24. 
 
According to the neo-Schumpeterian view, however, innovation rather than efficient 
allocation is the primary engine of productivity, and growth and market structure play a 
                                                 
22 Benkler, op. cit, 2001, p. 271. 
23 Schumpeter, J.A., (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 
p. 83, 89-90. 
24 Scherer, F., (1977), The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, The Monograph 
Series in Finance and Economics, New York, p. 14. 
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more important role than property rights in promoting innovation25. Diffusion propels 
innovation as a large number of producers and users may introduce improvements on 
the technology26. Innovation may take place in the absence of mechanisms based on the 
appropriation of knowledge. Lead time in the introduction of new products, the 
innovator’s capacity to move on the learning curve quicker than competitors, the 
customer’s loyalty derived from superior sale services, and the very structure of the 
market, such as oligopolistic market structures, may be sufficient to foster innovation27. 
In some sectors, IPRs do not play, indeed, an important role. Thus, an early study by 
Levin, Klevorich and Nelson found that firms in 130 lines of business reported that 
patents were the least important means of securing competitive advantage for new 
products28. Patent protection, in particular, may not be a key factor to promote 
innovation in many circumstances. The World Health Organization’s Commission on 
Innovation, Intellectual Property and Public Health, for instance, noted that patents do 
not work as an incentive for the development of drugs when profitable markets do not 
exist: 
 
In the context of our work one of the important points is that, where the market 
has very limited purchasing power, as is the case for diseases affecting millions 
of poor people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or 
effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market29. 
  
In sum, there is a need to find a fair balance between private and social benefits through 
a policy framework that does not only ensure that new technologies are created, but also 
that they disseminate for competitors to be able to work and improve on them. 
Disrupting the competitive process by means of excessive IPRs protection might not 
only result in higher prices but also in less subsequent technological change30. The 
                                                 
25 See Benkler, op. cit., 2001, p. 272. 
26 See, eg., OECD, (1992), Technology and the Economy, TEP, Paris, p. 51. 
27 See, e.g., Scherer, F. and Ross, D. (1990), Industrial market structure and economic 
performance, Hongton Miffin, Dallas  p. 627-628; Scherer, 1999, p. 59. 
28 Levin, R.; Klevorich, R. and Nelson, Richard, (1987), “Appropriating the returns from industrial 
research and development”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.3. 
  
29 WHO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 13 (2006) . 
30 See, e.g. Welfens, Paul; Addison, John; Audretsch, David; Gries, Thomas and Grupp, Hariolf, 
(1999), Globalization, Economic Growth and Innovation Dynamics, Springer, Berlin,  p. 138; 
Scherer and Ross, op. cit., p. 614-660. 
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oversimplified view that strong IPRs protection necessarily leads to more innovation 
and future benefits to society is both theoretically and empirically unsustainable. As 
noted by Mazzoleni and Nelson, 
 
“In view of the fact that patents entail social and economic costs, it would seem 
wise not to push for stronger patent protection, unless the evidence indicated that 
the economic benefits were significant. Such indications are certainly missing 
from the conventional interpretation of the available empirical studies”31. 
 
Most importantly, the balance between private and social benefits of IPRs protection is 
not necessarily the same in countries with different R&D capacities, levels of income 
and social needs. Poor countries may logically choose to prioritize access to existing 
products as  IPRs are unlikely to foster local innovation and governments need to face 
urgent needs. From both an equity32 and economic perspectives, it is essential, hence, 
that policy mechanisms ensure that innovation results reach those who need them. One 
obvious example is the case of pharmaceuticals, diagnostic kits and other health-related 
products upon which the health or life of human beings depend. 
 
The concrete impact of IPRs on innovation, competition and consumers depends on the 
specific terms and conditions under which such rights are granted. Although the TRIPS 
Agreement has contributed to a certain level of harmonization of IPRs worldwide, it 
only provides for minimum standards of protection. It does not prescribe homogenous 
rules and does not cover all aspects of IPRs. Hence, as further examined below, there is 
considerable leeway for determining, at the national level, various features of 
intellectual property legislation. This flexibility has been used, in some countries, to 
expand the field and to increase the level of protection of such rights. Many developing 
countries, however, have not fully utilized TRIPS flexibilities for various reasons33.  
                                                 
31 Mazzoleni, Roberto and Nelson, Richard, (1998), “The benefits and costs of strong patent 
protection: a contribution to the current debate”, Research Policy, vol.27., p. 274. 
32 A resolution approved on April 23, 2001by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 
called on governments to ensure the accessibility of  pharmaceuticals and medical treatments 
used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, as well as "their affordability for all," in accordance 
with  international law and international agreements. The resolution also calls on governments 
"to safeguard access to such preventive, curative or palliative pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies from any  limitations by third parties." 
33 See, e.g., Correa, Carlos (2007), TRIPS and TRIPS-plus protection and impacts in Latin 





A telling example of the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS system is provided by patent 
laws as applied in some developed countries. There is no universal definition of what 
type of subject matter may be a patentable ‘invention’ nor a universal rule about what 
level of inventiveness is required to obtain a patent. This has allowed the USA, for 
example, to grant patents over materials found in nature, computer programs and 
‘business methods’, which are generally not deemed patentable in other countries.  
 
In addition, there are important differences about the scope of patent claims. Japan, for 
instance, traditionally followed a policy of admitting only narrow claims, while in other 
countries the patent applicant may opt for broad claims. It has often been argued that a 
broad scope of protection and a long duration of rights will provide a strong incentive to 
innovate. But there are significant trade-offs. The broader and longer the IPRs 
protection, the higher the cost for society of using knowledge is. A broad scope of 
protection (in terms of the covered subject matter or of the extent of the rights of 
exclusion conferred) and a long duration of rights, reduce the degree of competition 
(and static efficiency) as well as the potential use of protected knowledge by subsequent 
innovators (and dynamic efficiency)34. Overbroad claims may be used to deter entry of 
competitors, especially small and medium companies that cannot bear the cost and risk 
of litigation. Skilled patent applicants, however, tend to assess the implications of 
opting for a broad or narrow claim, as it is not always optimal for the patentee to claim 
the maximum patent breadth possible. A patent that is too broad increases the likelihood 
of both infringement and patent validity challenges by competitors or other third 
parties35. 
 
The possible breadth of patent protection depends on national legislation. There are no 
international standards on the subject. Similarly, the extent to which a patent may be 
used to block a would-be competitor depends on the terms on which the "equivalence" 
                                                                                                                                               
 
34 See, e.g. Welfens et al, op. cit, p. 143. 
35 Amalia Yiannaka and Murray Fulton (2003), Strategic Patent Breadth and Entry Deterrence 
with Drastic Product Innovations, First Biennial Conference of the Food System Research 
Group, Madison-Wisconsin, June 2003, available at 
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/publications/conference/Yiannaka.pdf, p. 3 and 30. 
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of inventions is determined under the domestic law. Establishing the boundaries of 
protected inventions determines the actual scope of the rights conferred by a patent. It is 
a matter of national legislation to define when products or processes that are not 
literally described in a claim may be deemed "equivalent" and therefore considered as 
infringing on the patent rights.  
 
There are different approaches to deal with this issue. Under one approach (as applied in 
the USA), equivalence may be found if the allegedly infringing variant of a process or 
product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
the same result. Another approach relies not on  a functional analysis, but on an 
objective comparison of the elements that constitute the variant and the invention, and 
particularly on the extent to which the variant introduced by the potential infringer may 
be obvious36 for a person skilled in the art in the light of the claimed invention. This 
latter approach may permit an adequate protection of the inventor's interests, while 
leaving more room for third parties' innovation. A narrow doctrine of equivalents allows 
a broader room for competition and follow-on innovation. 
 
The scope of patent protection is also dependent on the standards applied to assess the 
patentability requirements, that is, novelty, inventive step (non obviousness) and 
industrial applicability (utility). Some efforts have been made to internationally 
harmonize these criteria. A first important attempt to harmonize substantive patent law, 
including patentability requirements, was launched by WIPO in 1984, with the 
ambitious objective of adopting a ‘Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as 
Patents are concerned’37. While this attempt failed (to a large extent due to 
discrepancies between the USA and European countries about the “first to file” or “first 
to invent” rule) in 2001, as a component of WIPO’s ‘Patent Agenda’, WIPO started a 
process to adopt a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) . The draft SPLT and 
regulations opted for a low requirement of inventive step38. It proposed to assess the 
claimed invention against the general knowledge of an ordinary skilled person, and not 
                                                 
36 The date at which the equivalence is assessed may be, depending on the doctrine applied, 
the filing date of the application, the date of publication of the patent or the date of infringement. 
The latter is the most favorable to the patentee. 
37 See, eg., WIPO, ‘Suggestions for the further development of international patent law’, WIPO 
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (Fourth Session, Geneva, November 6-10,2000 
WIPO Document No. SCP/4/2 September 25, 2000. 
 
38 See WIPO SCP/9/8 Prov. para. 102 
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against specialized knowledge in a particular field of technology. The SPLT found 
considerable opposition from developing countries who are unwilling to give up the 
policy space still left to them for crafting the patentability requirements.  
 
The main problem faced in this area is the proliferation of patents on subject matter with 
low or inexistent inventive step.  The relaxation of the patentability standards is one of 
the factors behind the ‘intense pathology of the current [patent] system’ in the United 
States39. The low standards of patentability applied, in particular, to assess non-
obviousness, has led to an explosion of patent applications and grants in that country. 
The acquisition of patent rights for defensive or offensive reasons has significantly 
increased the cost of IPRs management and litigation40. ‘Evergreening’41 and other 
patenting strategies aimed at blocking genuine competition and follow on innovation 
have become common practice in many jurisdictions42.  
 
Lax patentability requirements have distorted the intended objective of the patent 
system: promoting and rewarding genuine contributions to the state of the art. 
Ineffective enforcement of the patentability requirements create opportunities to protect 
technical developments the cost of which is considerably less than the value of the 
monopoly provided by the patent law. As noted by Adelman, those who obtain such a 
protection would "be seizing monopoly control of obvious developments rather than 
obtaining the rightful reward for unique creations, and in doing so would generate a 
socially wasteful rivalry for control of the high profits"43. 
 
Patents, in fact, are strategically used in many cases to deter competitors, actual or 
potential, rather than as instruments to obtain a legitimate reward for a technical 
contribution. This practice has been extensively documented, for instance, in the 
                                                 
39 Jaffe, Adam B. and Lerner, Josh (2004), Innovation and Its Discontents : How Our Broken 
Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It, Princeton 
University Press, p. 19. 
40 See James Bessen and Michael J.Meurer (2008), Patent Failure, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  
41 ‘Evergreening’ consists of the patenting of minor changes to or versions of existing products 
(e.g. formulations, dosage forms, polymorphs, salts, etc.) in order to extend the life of the 
original patent over an active ingredient. 
42 See Carlos Correa, Internationalization of the patent system and new technologies, 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 20. No.3, 2002.  
43 Adelman, Martin (1977), “Property rights theory and patent-antritust: the role of compulsory 
licensing”, New York University Law Review, vol. 52, No.5. 
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pharmaceutical industry. In spite that the number of new chemical entities approved for 
pharmaceutical use is small and declining, thousands of patents are applied for and 
granted on minor variants of existing medicines (e.g. isomers, polymorphs, 
formulations, combinations) that lack inventive step. The granted patents are often 
aggressively used to block generic competition. A recent report by the European 
Commission on the pharmaceutical industry -released in November 200844- provided 
robust evidence on these practices in Europe. Among other findings, the report observed 
that  
 
originator companies have designed and implemented strategies (a "tool-box" of 
instruments) aimed at ensuring continued revenue streams for their medicines. 
Although there may be other reasons for delays to generic entry, the successful 
implementation of these strategies may have the effect of delaying or blocking 
such entry. The strategies observed include filing for up to 1,300 patents EU-
wide in relation to a single medicine (so-called "patent clusters"), engaging in 
disputes with generic companies leading to nearly 700 cases of reported patent 
litigation, concluding settlement agreements with generic companies which may 
delay generic entry and intervening in national procedures for the approval of 
generic medicines. The additional costs caused by delays to generic entry can be 
very significant for the public health budgets and ultimately the consumer’.  
 
The European Commission report also found that ‘originator companies develop and 
practice defensive patenting strategies primarily in order to block the development of 
new competing products, which can lead to obstacles to innovation, higher costs for 
competing pharmaceutical companies (e.g. royalties), or in delays’45. 
 
The grant and use of other types of IPRs may also have significant implications for 
development. Some of the relevant issues relating to copyright, trademarks, 
geographical indications and plant breeders’ rights are briefly discussed below. 
 
 Copyright 
                                                 
44 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. Preliminary Report , Executive Summary, DG Competition 
Staff Working Paper, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/exec_summary_en.pdf, p. 3. 
45 Idem, p. 4 
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The scope and level of copyright protection may affect access to knowledge for 
research, education and training in multiple areas. Traditionally, copyright law left 
considerable room for access to and use of copyrighted materials. The ‘idea-expression’ 
dichotomy ensured that ideas remained free for use while copyrighted prevented the 
reproduction of their particular expression46. This dichotomy is recognized under many 
national patent laws and in the TRIPS Agreement47. Moreover, the rights conferred to 
the copyright owner may be limited by a number of defences and exceptions that ensure 
a balance between exclusive rights and fundamental freedoms and rights, such as the 
human right to education48. 
 
Copyright may play a positive role by supporting the activities of local musicians and 
other artists in developing countries. However, most benefits, including jobs, generated 
by their performances and works are currently captured by developed countries where 
the large entertainment companies operate. Moreover, the availability of copyright 
protection for such authors and artists in their own countries would be insufficient to 
allow them to reap the benefits of their works and performances. The important markets 
are in developed countries,but, given the costs of legal advice and litigation, enforcing 
copyrights there is almost impossible for developing countries’ authors and artists. 
Hence, policies aimed at strengthening copyright protection in developing countries in 
some cases are likely to benefit more foreign creators and companies than local ones49. 
                                                 
46 For instance, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor stated that ‘copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.  This 
principle, known as the "idea/expression" or "fact/expression" dichotomy, applies to all works of 
authorship’. 
47 Article 9.2 stipulates that ‘[C]opyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such’. 
 
48 As recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and reaffirmed by 
various human rights treaties, including the Convention against Discrimination in Education 
(1960), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981). See, e.g. 
UNESCO (2007), A human rights-based approach to education for all, New York. 
49 For instance, studies conducted for WIPO found that the Mercosur countries were net 
importers of copyrighted works and that the largest share of local value added corresponded to 
the distribution sector. The available figures underlied the relative weakness of domestic 
production of copyright-protected products.  See UNICAMP-WIPO, Study on the economic 
importance of industries and activities protected by copyright and related rights in the Mercosur 
countries and Chile, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/pdf/copyright_mercosur.pdf. In the case of India, 
however, the software and film industries are likely to significantly benefit from copyright 
protection.   
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The ‘Africa Music Project’ initiated by the World Bank provides a good illustration of 
the limitations of a copyright-based strategy to support poor musicians: 
 
at present, virtually all African music that enjoys an international market is 
produced in Paris or London—the agglomeration of jobs that successful African 
music generates is not in Africa… Part of the dream of the music project is that 
more African artists make it big in international markets. However, reality here 
is not to pick such potential winners and promote them along the path successful 
artists have followed—that path lying mostly outside of Africa. The idea is to 
build an industry for the 30,000 low income musicians, recognizing that the 
measure of success would be a modest increase of earnings for each of them50.  
  
In the context of developing countries, the immediate effect of strengthening copyright 
protection may be to limit access to copyrighted products, including computer programs 
and educational materials. Such effect could be aggravated if national laws do not 
provide for appropriate exceptions to the exclusive rights or implement new modalities 
of protection for digital works, such as technological protection measures (TPMs)51 and 
‘anti-circumvention’ measures52, without the proper safeguards. These measures may 
restrain access to information in the public domain if digitized information cannot be 
otherwise obtained.  
 
Although copyright has traditionally excluded facts and data from eligible subject 
matter, recent developments in some developed countries ‘now make it possible to 
assert and enforce proprietarial claims to virtually all the factual matter that previously 
entered the public domain once it had been disclosed’53. The European Database 
                                                 
50 Frank J. Penna, Monique Thormann and Michael Finger (2004), The Africa Music Project, In 
J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (editors), Poor People's Knowledge. Promoting Intellectual 
Property in Developing Countries, World Bank and Oxford University Press, p. 97. 
51 ‘Technology protection measures’ are legal remedies against acts aiming at removing or 
altering any digital rights management information, that is, access control technologies used by 
publishers and other copyright holders to limit the usage of digital media or devices without prior 
authorization  
52 These measures prevent the use of "circumventing" devices or services to defeat technical 
means of protection (such as encryption) of copyrighted works. 
53 Reichman, J. & Uhlir, P., (2005), “Global Trends to Restrict Access to data from Government 
Funded Research”, paper prepared for use at the Yale University Conference on Global 
Information Flows, p. 4-5. 
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Directive (1996), for example,  allows for a practically perpetual protection of 
information (including of factual nature) in a data base54. 
 
While in the last twenty years the protection of copyright has been actively promoted by 
some industries and developed countries’ governments, in designing copyright 
legislation it is important to consider measures to protect and exploit the public domain. 
It comprises of a vast pool of knowledge available for use without authorization or 
payment. Contrary to the assumption that underlies IPRs protection, free availability of 
knowledge may spur innovation. For instance, what is termed the ‘open software’ 
movement has demonstrated that innovation may flourish under a system that does not 
restrict but is based on the free sharing of innovations in software. Another example is 
provided by ‘open content “ initiatives55 aiming at publishing creative works in a format 
that explicitly allows users of the content to freely copy, distribute and possibly derive 
new works based on the content56.  
 
The public domain constitutes an important pool of knowledge available to all. It should 
be protected against undue appropriation. Protecting and enriching the public domain 
may be, particularly for developing countries, the best option to promote innovations 
and access to its outcomes in certain fields. Prof. Boyle has noted that 
 
In fact, it is remarkable to consider that the areas where the Internet has 
succeeded most readily – for example as a giant distributed database of facts on 
any subject under the sun – are traditionally those in which there are little or no 
intellectual property rights. The software on which the Internet runs is largely 
                                                 
54 The US Supreme Court, however, has rejected the protection of factual information as such 
and that the US Congress has not enacted legislation in line with the model adopted by the 
European Directive. in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., it was stated that 
‘as applied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only 
the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at 
will.  This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.  It is the means by which copyright advances 
the progress of science and art” (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 
U.S. 340, 1991, paragraph 19). 
55 One example is ‘Creative Commons’ Its main goal is to enable copyright holders that want to 
grant some of their rights over their works to the public but expect to retain some others, to be 
able to easily do that through the use of appropriate creative commons licenses. See 
http://creativecommons.org. 
56 See Schweik, Grove and Evans (2004), “The Open-source Paradigm and the Production of 
Scientific Information: A Future Vision and Implications for Developing Countries”, in Open 
Access and the Public Domain in Digital Data and Information for Science: Proceedings of an 
International Symposium, p. 106. 
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open source, another Internet-enabled method of innovation to which policy 
makers have been slow to adapt. The Internet offers us remarkable opportunities 
to achieve the real goals that intellectual property policy ought to serve: 
encouraging innovation and facilitating the dissemination of cultural and 
educational materials. Yet policy making has focused almost entirely on the 
Internet’s potential for illicit copying57. 
 
As of September 4, 2006, at least 99 governments in 44 countries had undertaken 
administrative or legislative action in support of open source software (OSS) 
development58. While legislation has been adopted in 19 countries (mostly in Europe 
and Latin America) 59 in others (e.g. France) OSS has been introduced, namely by 
migrating from Microsoft Windows to Linux systems, through public subsidies or 
procurement policies of State departments60.  
 
Of particular importance is also to ensure that measures aimed at protecting digital 
works, such as TPMs and ‘anti-circumvention measures’, do not limit the use of 
copyrighted works even for legitimate purposes. TPMs designed to prevent third parties 
from unauthorized access to and use of digital works may permit right-holders to 
control, monitor and meter every possible use of a work. If strengthened by the legal 
prohibition to defeat them, such systems create new and powerful means to prevent 




The implications of trademark protection are more neutral than those of other titles of 
IPRs, as they may benefit large and small companies alike, in both developed and 
developing countries. Trademarks, in addition, perform a dual role in protecting the 
goodwill of their owners and at, the same time, the public against the misleading use of 
the same or confusing trademarks. However, those companies that may invest 
                                                 
57 Boyle, 2004, op. cit. 
58 Jyh-An Lee (2006),  New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of 
Open Source Software, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, Vol. 9:1, p. 
56. 
59 This trend towards the adoption of OSS is less apparent in Africa than in other regions. Jyh-
An Lee, op. cit., p. 56. 
60 Idem, p. 62. 
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significant resources in promoting their trademarks and which operate internationally 
can benefit the most from trademark registration and use. In fact, the obligations 
introduced by the TRIPS Agreement and soft law developed in the context of WIPO61 
clearly favour large companies with transnational activities. The TRIPS Agreement, in 
particular, reinforced the protection of well-known trademarks in a way that permit an 
unregistered trademark to prevail over a registered trademark if the former has become 
notorious through its use or promotion.  
 
Trademark law is the only area where compulsory licensing is not admitted by the 
TRIPS Agreement, although there have been cases in the past in which such licenses 




The recognition and use of geographical indications present more complex 
implications. Such indications allow producers of a given locality or region to obtain a 
premium price for the quality, characteristics or reputation of a product attributable to 
its geographical origin. Although some developing countries have joined European 
countries in efforts to expand and reinforce the protection of geographical indications in 
the framework of the TRIPS Agreement63, there is little empirical evidence suggesting 
that this is the right strategy for developing countries. While there is a large number of 
GIs in Europe that may be globally exploited, there are only a few GIs in developing 
countries that may allow producers to obtain a significant benefit. In addition, obtaining 
                                                 
61 See the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known 
Marks, adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and 
the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on September 20 
to 29, 1999, available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833.htm. 
 
62 The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed in the case FTC v. Cereal Companies 
the creation of five completely new companies and required the major existing firms (Kellogg, 
General Mills and General Food) to license their trademarks. In FTC v. Borden Company, it 
found market dominance in the lemon juice market and the Judge decided to compulsorily 
license the “Realemon” trademark. See Goldstein, Sol, (1977), “A study of compulsory 
licensing”,  LES, , p. 124 
63 The European Union, Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand 
and Turkey have supported the expansion of GIs protection through an amendment to article 23 
of the TRIPS Agreement, while other countries (notably Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Guatemala, New Zealand and Uruguay strongly opposed to it.  
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international recognition of a particular GI may require substantial investment, and 
enforcing GIs rights in foreign jurisdictions may be extremely costly and outside the 
reach of producers from developing countries. Although the Indian government, for 
instance, has voiced in the WTO its interest in enhancing GI’s protection64, in the 
absence of evidence about the potential benefits of a reform of current standards -which 
may overwhelmingly benefit those countries with a long and solid tradition in GIs- 
more caution has been advised: 
 
At the multilateral level, it is extremely important for India to weigh the costs 
and benefits of GI protection in general, and the ‘extension’ of Article 23 in 
particular. Given the scarcity of research-based inputs in this regard, there has so 
far not been much clarity on these issues. Hence, rather than pushing too hard 
for the ‘extension’ at the WTO, a more prudent approach on the part of India 
would be to ‘go slow’65. 
 
In  another report it was argued that GIs may be useful to protect indigenous 
knowledge, if ‘combined with appropriate marketing strategies’, but it was warned that 
the protection conferred does not include the knowledge as such, but only the 
designation66. It was found that GIs ‘can present long term benefits as they create value, 
enhance the marketability of goods and give an edge to developing countries to promote 
exports and rural development’  with the caveat that the overall costs and benefits of 
GI’s protection are not, however, sufficiently clear. The report also recommended 
caution on the subject, particularly by carefully weighing the opportunity costs in 
                                                 
64 The Indian position was strongly influenced by the use of the name ‘basmati’ to identify 
aromatic rice grown in the USA, where the American company RiceTec Inc. was granted a 
patent on a rice variety using that designation. See, e.g. TED Case Studies. Basmati, available 
at http://www.american.edu/ted/basmati.htm. 
 
65 Kasturi Das (2007), Protection of Geographical Indications: An Overview of Select Issues with 
Particular Reference to India, available at http://www.centad.org/cwp_10.asp. This report points 
out that around 30 GIs of Indian origin have already been registered in the country. These 
include Darjeeling (tea), Pochampalli, Ikat (textiles), Chanderi (sarees), Kancheepuram silk 
(textiles), Kashmir Pashmina (shawls), Kondapalli (toys), and Mysore (agarbattis). 
66 Daphne Zografos (2008),  Geographical Indications & Socio-Economic Development” , 
IQSensato, available at http://www.iqsensato.org/., p. 16. 
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relation to less known products67. In addition, it would be important to consider the 
possible displacement of local industries if foreign GIs are recognized. For instance, 
while the TRIPS Agreement allowed Members to continue in the use of foreign GIs 
under certain circumstances68, this flexibility was lost by many countries in subsequent 
bilateral negotiations with the European Union, as it succeeded in obtaining the 
recognition of protection for  GIs that were exempted under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Plant variety protection 
 
Finally, attention should be paid to the implications of the protection of plants for 
agricultural development and food supply. A sui generis form of protection for plant 
varieties69 -known as ‘plant variety protection’ (PVP) or ‘breeders’ rights’- was adopted 
in some European countries since the 1940’s leading to the adoption of an international 
convention (International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants-
UPOV) by a Diplomatic Conference in Paris in 1961. The UPOV Convention –
                                                 
67 Idem, p. 17. 
68 TRIPS Agreement article 24.4: 4. ‘Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent 
continued and similar use of a particular geographical indication of another Member identifying 
wines or spirits in connection with goods or services by any of its nationals or domiciliaries who 
have used that geographical indication in a continuous manner with regard to the same or 
related goods or services in the territory of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years 
preceding 15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that date’; article 24.6: ‘Nothing in this 
Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical 
indication of any other Member with respect to goods or services for which the relevant 
indication is identical with the term customary in common language as the common name for 
such goods or services in the territory of that Member. Nothing in this Section shall require a 
Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with 
respect to products of the vine for which the relevant indication is identical with the customary 
name of a grape variety existing in the territory of that Member as of the date of entry into force 
of the WTO Agreement’. 
 
 
69 The UPOV Convention (Article 1(vi)) defines a ‘plan variety’ as: "a plant grouping within a 
single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the 
conditions for the grant of a breeder's right are fully met, can be 
- defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or 
combination of genotypes, 
- distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics and 
- considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged;" 
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subsequently amended in 1978 and 1991- contributed to frame the protection for plant 
varieties in developed countries. Only a few developing countries initially adopted an 
UPOV-like legislation or adhered to the Convention. This changed after article 27.3(b)70 
of the TRIPS Agreement obliged Members to provide patents or some sui generis form 
of protection to such varieties. Although various proposals were elaborated for the 
design of sui generis regimes of protection, many developing countries opted for the 
UPOV model and became members of the Convention after 1995. 
Although PVP has been less controversial than patent protection, concerns have been 
raised from different perspectives about its impact on plant innovation and diffusion. 
For some, PVP only benefits commercial breeders by creating private ownership rights 
to biodiversity, to the detriment of farmers/breeders and traditional. The recognition of 
PVP would only reward those at the very end of a more complex system of innovation 
and seed production, eventually limit farmers’ and communities’ rights to biodiversity 
and even reduce their space to innovate. The criteria for protection (in particular of 
uniformity) would exacerbate the erosion of biodiversity, leading to harvest loss and 
further food insecurity71. 
From another perspective, PVP is seen as insufficient to promote investment in the 
development of new varieties. One important reason for this would be that under such a 
protection a registered variety may be legitimately used by a third party as the source 
for the development of other varieties (breeders’ exemption). In addition, PVP in many 
countries (such as the USA) allows farmers to save and re-use seeds within their 
exploitations without additional payments to the breeder (farmers’ exception). One 
study concluded the following: 
                                                 
70 Article 27.3 b) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that members may exclude from 
patentability ‘plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. This provision shall 
be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement’.  
 
71 See GAIA/GRAIN (1998), ‘Ten reasons not to join UPOV’, Global Trade and Biodiversity in 
Conflict, No. 2, May, available at http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=1.  
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Our assessment strongly suggests that the PVPA does not provide patent-like ex 
ante innovation and investment incentives and that the PVPA has not generated 
substantial ex post licensing and enforcement activity. Instead, its role in the 
United States appears to be very modest: it may serve as a marketing tool; it may 
provide some non-propagation licensing rights akin to contractual shrink-wrap 
rights, enforceable against those who deal in "saved" seeds; and it may provide a 
superior alternative to trade secret protection - for example, for seeds whose 
secret parent lines might otherwise be revealed through reverse engineering 
(Kesan and Janis,  2002).  
 
Patent protection for plant varieties, however, is only conferred in a few countries 
(USA, Australia, Japan) but it is banned in many jurisdictions (including European and 
most developing countries). The ban does not generally apply to plants as such, cells 
and sub-cellular parts, such as genes. Hence, in many jurisdictions patents may be 
granted on 
 
* DNA sequences that code for a certain protein;  
 
* isolated or purified proteins: 
 




* plant cells and plants; 
 




* processes to genetically modify plants; and 
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* processes to obtain hybrids72. 
 
The possibility of patenting plants and parts thereof has created tension between patent 
and plant variety protection. While traditional breeders favor the latter, companies 
working with modern biotechnology generally prefer the former, as the exceptions are 
more limited than under PVP and the control over the market is greater. Given the 
flexible rule contained in article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, countries have wide 
room (much greater than for patents, copyrights and other areas) to introduce a system 
for plant variety  protection that suits the particular conditions under which seeds are 
produced, distributed and used. 
 
3. TRIPS flexibilities, technology transfer and industrialization 
 
As mentioned, the TRIPS Agreement introduced for the first time in the history of IPRs 
a set of minimum standards of protection that has significantly reduced the capacity of 
WTO members to determine the scope and extent of protection for such rights. 
 
Although the new international framework was presented by developed countries during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations as an instrument to promote innovation in and transfer 
of technology to developing countries, there is no evidence suggesting that increased 
IPRs protection has contributed to attain those objectives. Expectedly, the impact of 
IPRs on innovation will heavily depend, inter alia, on the local scientific and 
technological infrastructure, the industrial profile and the availability of capital to fund 
R&D. Some developing countries (such as China, Brazil and India) that are more 
scientifically advanced than others, are starting to reap benefits from decades of 
investments in education, research infrastructure, and manufacturing capacity. These 
countries -which have been called in recent literature ‘innovative developing countries’ 
(IDCs)73, invest in R&D relatively more than other developing countries, there is a 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Boettiger, S., Graff, G., Pardey, P. Van Dusen, E. and W right, B (2004), 
‘Intellectual Property Rights for Plant Biotechnology: International Aspects’, in Paul Christou and 
Harry Klee (Editors-in-Chief), Intellectual Property Rights for Plant Biotechnology: International 
Aspects. Handbook of Plant Biotechnology, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chichester, p. 1093. 
73 Morel, Carlos, Tara Acharya, Denis Broun, Ajit Dangi,Christopher Elias, N. K. Ganguly, 
Charles A. Gardner, R. K. Gupta, Jane Haycock, Anthony D. Heher, Peter J. Hotez, Hannah E. 
Kettler, Gerald T. Keusch,Anatole F. Krattiger, Fernando T. Kreutz, Sanjaya Lall, Keun Lee, 
Richard Mahoney, 
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greater involvement of  the private sector, and the interactions between public 
institutions and private companies and with innovation agents in developed countries 
are relatively frequent. These countries are best positioned than other developing 
countries to exploit some modalities of IPRs to their own benefit. However, the greater 
capacity of the IDCs should not lead to wrong conclusions. A large part of the 
population in these countries lives under the poverty line and may be seriously affected 
by the implementation of IPRs that limit access to essential products, such as drugs and 
seeds. 
 
The industrialization and modernization of agricultural practices will continue to depend 
in most developing countries on the access to foreign technologies. A key issue is, 
hence, the extent to which the new set of international standards may foster or deter the 
transfer of technology to such countries. 
 
Transfer of technology may take place through formal (e.g. licensing agreements) and 
informal (e.g. reverse engineering) means. Studies on technological development 
suggest that the relevance of different modes of technology transfer significantly vary in 
at different stages of industrial development74. The type and content of such transfers 
evolve as the technological capabilities of domestic firms increase. Three stages of 
industrial development -initiation, internalization and generation- may be identified75 .  
 
At the initiation stage, mostly "mature" technologies are incorporated through informal 
channels of technology transfer, notably the acquisition of machinery and equipment 
and reverse engineering76.However, more formal modes of transfer are also used, such 
as turn-key agreements for the establishment of plants, particularly where production 
processes are complex and plant lay-outs are difficult to imitate. Foreign direct 
                                                                                                                                               
Adolfo Martinez-Palomo, R. A. Mashelkar, Stephen A. Matlin, Mandi Mzimba, Joachim Oehler, 
Robert G. Ridley, Pramilla Senanayake, Peter Singer, and  Mikyung Yun,  (2005). ‘Health 
Innovation Networks to Help Developing Countries Address Neglected Diseases’, Science, Vol. 
309, 15 July  p. 401. 
74 See, e.g., Kim, L. (1997).  Imitation to Innovation. The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological 
Learning, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
 
75 See Lee, Z., Bae, Z. and Choi, D. (1988), "Technology development processes: a model for a 
developing country with a global persepctive", R&D Management, vol. 18, N 3. p. 242. 
76 In the case of South Asian countries, the supply of technical assistance provided by Original 
Equipment Suppliers (OEM) also played an important role at the initiation stage. See Kim, L. 
and Dahlman, C. (1992), "Technology policy for industrialization: an integrative framework and 
Korea's experience", Research Policy, N 21, p. 439. 
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investment (FDI) can also constitute an important channel of technology transfer at the 
initiation stage as local absorptive capabilities are low77.  
 
At the ‘internalization’ stage licensing and sub-contracting become more important 
channels of technology transfer and  foreign direct investment may also play an 
important role. However, local firms in developing countries may find obstacles to 
obtain up-to-date technologies since technology owners do not wish to create 
competitors, especially when low-cost producers may challenge their positions in global 
markets.  
 
Finally, at the ‘generation’ stage local companies may use a broader range of channels 
for the acquisition of technology, including licensing agreements, equity or non-equity 
technological partnerships such as cooperative agreements with other firms aiming at 
the achievement of mutually relevant outcomes through the transfer, sharing or 
development of technology, with little or no mutual hard control78.  
 
IPRs are likely to play a different role in these different stages of industrial 
development.  During the ‘initiation’ stage IPRs are essentially neutral as they do not 
affect the main (informal) channels of technological acquisition and do not play a 
significant role either as incentives to innovation or barriers to a still limited level of 
imitation. At the ‘internalization’ stage, industries imitation capacity increases and 
IPRs, if too stringent, may impede technological catching up through reverse 
engineering and imitation. For this reason, new industrializing countries (such as Japan, 
South Korea, China) have tended to keep a flexible IPRs system during that stage 
thereby allowing firms to get access to relatively mature foreign technologies via 
licensing, sub-contracting or foreign direct investment. However, given the increased 
local capacity to imitate, tensions about IPRs protection between domestic and foreign 
firms tend to augment during this stage. Finally, when local industries become more 
innovative at the ‘generation’ phase, foreign technology owners are more sensitive 
                                                 
77 See Correa, C. (2000a).  Emerging trends: new patterns of technology transfer.  In Patel, S.,  
Roffe, P. and Yusf, A. (eds.), International Technology Transfer: The Origins  
and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct, Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, p. 263. 
78 These "technological partnerships" may be regarded as a particular form of strategic 
alliances.  See, e.g.,  Mothe, Caroline, (1997), Comment Réussir une Alliance en Recherche et 
Développement, L´Harmattan, Paris, p. 73. 
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about possible imitation, while local demands for strengthened IPRs protection also 
emerge in order to protect growing domestic investments in R&D and to stimulate the 
licensing-in of more up-to-date foreign technologies79.  
 
As noted above, historically countries have adapted their IPRs regimes to their different 
levels of economic and technological development. They increased IPRs protection, 
notably in the case of patents, as their industries reached higher levels of technological 
capacity. This adaptive approach is now precluded for WTO members, except LDCs 
until the expiry of the transitional periods allowed under article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Developing countries have been required to introduce standards of 
protection at the ‘initiation’ and ‘internalization’ stages before they have reached a 
situation in which they could benefit from some forms of IPRs protection. 
 
Proponents of the TRIPS Agreement have argued that the strengthening of IPRs 
protection would increase technology transfer to developing countries. The availability 
of protection and the enforceability of conferred rights would provide title-holders 
sufficient assurances to part with their technologies and would promote its transfer. This 
simplistic view ignored, however, the firms’ preference to directly exploit their 
technological advantages, wherever possible, rather than sharing it with potential 
competitors80.  
 
An important issue for policy makers is the extent to which the standards of the TRIPS 
Agreement may be implemented in a manner that favors technology transfer to 
developing countries. A number of flexibilities can be used by such countries for that 
purpose. 
 
It is worth recalling that, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, adopted in Doha in November 200181,82. Although this Declaration83 specifies 
                                                 
79 See e.g., Correa, Carlos (2007), Intellectual property in LDCs: strategies for enhancing 




80 In cases where technology is transferred, the recipient’s capacity to compete is generally 
limited by means of contractual restrictions, such as limitation of the license to a limited territory, 
prohibition to export and field of use restrictions.  
81 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 14 November 2001(hereinafter ‘the Doha Declaration’).  
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some of the flexibilities available to facilitate access to pharmaceutical products, it is 
relevant to IPRs in any field of technology. The wording of the chapeau of paragraph 5 
makes it clear that it only enumerates some of the possible flexibilities84. In particular, 
Paragraph 5 (a) and (b) of the Declaration (see Box 1) are important for the 
implementation of measures intended to expand domestic production with the use of 
protected technologies. 
 
Box 1. Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health- Paragraphs 5 (a) and (b) 
 
 
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of 
the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles. 
 
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 




Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 5 of Doha Declaration confirms the relevance of article 
7 of the TRIPS Agreement for the interpretation of its provisions85. This article provides 
                                                                                                                                               
82 Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration states:  
‘We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all. 
 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose’. 
83 A declaration is not, under WTO law an ‘authoritative interpretation’ in terms of Article IX.2 of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. However, in practice it may have equivalent 
effects. Members have provided in paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration an agreed 
interpretation on certain aspects of the TRIPS Agreement that WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body should take into account in disputes relating to that Agreement. 
84 The chapeau of paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration states: ‘ Accordingly and in the light of 
paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize 
that these flexibilities include:…’. 
 
85 Before the adoption of the Doha Declaration, in Canada-Patent protection of pharmaceutical 
products, a WTO panel had argued, in connection with TRIPS Article 30, that “the goals and the 
limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8 ” as well as those of “other provisions of the TRIPS 
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that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights ‘should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology’, thereby suggesting that the TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in a 
manner that favors access by third parties to technology necessary to further innovation 
and domestic production. The Agreement should not be regarded as a charter of 
absolute rights to control the exploitation of protected technologies, but rather as an 
instrument that requires the use of such technologies ‘to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare’ (article 7). 
 
The confirmation of the Members’ leeway to determine the grounds for the granting of 
compulsory licenses in sub-paragraph (b) opens the possibility for granting such 
licenses in cases of lack of industrial exploitation of a patent, as further discussed 
below. Although limited to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), paragraph 7 of the 
Doha Declaration also confirms that transfer of technology in order to create 
manufacturing capacity is consistent with the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement86. 
Scope of protection  
A basic flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement relates to the scope of protection conferred 
under different types of IPRs. Although WTO Members do not have full freedom to 
determine such a scope, they have certain margin to apply more or less expansive 
policies. Some examples of such a flexibility are given below. 
Under copyright rules countries may limit protection to works that present some level of 
originality to be determined in accordance with criteria set out by the national law. 
Countries have historically applied different criteria to establish originality, and the 
TRIPS Agreement does not specify how strict such criteria should be. The stricter the 
criteria, the narrower the scope of protection87. In addition, said Agreement does not 
                                                                                                                                               
Agreement which indicate its object and purposes …must obviously be borne in mind” in 
interpreting TRIPS provisions (WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000, para. 7.26). 
 
86 Paragraph 7: ‘We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide 
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to 
least-developed country members pursuant to Article 66.2…’. 
87 For example, in Germany, where the determination of originality was subject to more stringent 
criteria than under US and other laws, computer programs that were deemed copyrightable 
under the latter were not protectable under German law. 
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oblige Member countries to implement TPMs or anti-circumvention measures. Even if 
they opted to join the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996), this Treaty permits contracting 
parties to allow access to digitized information for fair use, a possibility precluded 
under some national laws. Similarly, the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige Members to 
protect non-original databases, as is the case, as noted above, under European law88. In 
the field of computer programs, based on the already mentioned ‘idea-expression 
dichotomy- national laws may allow for the reverse engineering of source code. 
WTO Members are obliged, under article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, to protect 
trademarks  defined as ‘any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing 
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings’. The same 
provision stipulates that ‘Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs 
be visually perceptible’. This means that members may, but are not obliged to protect 
olfactory or sound marks89. 
 
The room for maneuver left by the TRIPS Agreement in the area of patents to determine 
the scope of protection may be of great significance for innovation and industrialization 
policies in developing countries where the overwhelmingly majority of patents are of 
foreign origin90. Although such a room is limited, it may be used to facilitate follow-on 
innovation and transfer of technology. The TRIPS Agreement specifies that an 
                                                 
88 The FTAs signed by the USA do not contain an obligation to protect such databases, 
consistently with US legislation that so far has not incorporated the European type of protection. 
Although article 139.3 of the ‘Economic Partnership Agreement’ between the EU and 
CARIFORUM countries includes ‘data bases’ in the definition of ‘intellectual property’, it does 
not develop specific standards of protection for them.  
89 There have also been attempts to register ‘taste’ marks. For instance, Eli Lilly tried to register 
the taste of artificial strawberry flavour as a taste mark for pharmaceuticals. This met with 
objections in 2003 from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) based on Articles 7(1)(a) 
(insufficient graphic representation), 7(1)(b) (lack of distinctive character) and 7(1)(c) (the mark 
was descriptive of the goods, or one of their characteristics) (see 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2003/09/taste-mark-refused-trade-mark.html). In In re N.V. Organon, 
(Serial No. 76467774, 79 USPQ2d (BNA) 1639 (TTAB 14 June 2006) the USPTO also held that 
the flavour orange is not registrable for use with quick-dissolving antidepressant tablets and pills 
(see http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/2/5/279).  
 
90 Some reports have indicated a notable expansion in local patenting in some developing 
countries, but a correct interpretation of data suggests an overstatement of current trends. See 
X Li, ‘Demystifying explosion in patenting growth rate’, South Bulletin, Issue 1, October 2007, 
available at http://www.southcentre.org (last visited 19 November 2007). 
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invention should be patented if it meets the standards of novelty, inventive step (or non-
obviousness) and industrial applicability (or utility). However, the Agreement 
 
a) does not define what an ‘invention’ is. Hence, WTO Members may exclude 
from patentability products found in nature, features inherent in certain 
matters91, computer programs, and business methods which are, however, 
patentable in some jurisdictions (e.g. USA) under expansive rules on 
patentability.  
 
b) allows  for different interpretations of the concept of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial applicability. For instance, under US law a double standard of novelty 
is applied depending on whether the disclosure of the invention has taken place 
within or outside the territory of the USA (35 U.S.C section 102 (a))92. The USA 
defended this flexibility at the Council for TRIPS arguing that there was ‘no 
prescription as to how WTO Members define what inventions are to be 
considered “new” within their domestic systems’ and, hence, that its legislation 
was ‘perfectly consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement’93. 
Of crucial importance for developing countries is the flexibility available to determine 
the existence of ‘inventive step’. As mentioned, some countries (such as the USA) apply 
lax standards of patentability thereby allowing for the proliferation of patents over very 
minor technical developments in various fields. Patents are growingly used as strategic 
instruments to block competition and third parties’ innovation rather than to recoup 
research and development costs. There is a significant increase in litigation costs, but 
most importantly, patents fail to perform its intended function as an incentive for 
innovation. In accordance to a recent study,  
the net incentives provided by the patent system vary significantly across 
industries and other groupings. For example, the chemical and pharmaceutical 
                                                 
91 Such as the polymorphic forms of a chemical compound. 
92 According to this section ‘A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was 
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this 
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or the invention 
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or 
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the 
United States...’. 
93 See document IP/Q3/USA/1, May 1, 1998. 
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industries show substantially more positive incentives than do other industries. 
Second, although firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have 
positive incentives, by the late 1990s the net incentives of the patent system 
became significantly negative outside of these industries94. 
 
 
A key point is that patent offices and courts can apply more or less lax or stringent 
criteria to determine non-obviousness/inventive step. Since the TRIPS Agreement does 
not define the concept of inventive step, is that Member countries are free to determine 
whether they want a system under which a myriad of  incremental innovations are 
patentable, or one aimed at rewarding more substantive departures from the prior art.  
 
Although it might be argued that a low standard of inventive step would permit 
patenting by local companies, there is no economic justification to grant patent rights 
over minor innovations, whether claimed by local or foreign companies, as patents 
would limit their diffusion without any significant gains in terms of the creation of a 
domestic technological capacity. Moreover, since patents are costly to obtain and, in 
particular, to enforce, a low threshold of patentability is likely to overwhelmingly favor 
foreign companies with sophisticated patenting strategies and well established and 
funded departments to manage intellectual property assets. In addition, incremental 
developments may be protected under utility models95. 
 
For a developing country willing to promote the absorption of foreign technologies and 
domestic innovation, the best policy would seem to keep the standard of inventive step 
high so as to facilitate the broad dissemination of minor/incremental innovations and 
                                                 
94 Judges, p. 120-121. While this statement is applicable for a large economy like the USA, the 
finding about the incentives for the pharmaceutical industry needs to be qualified. As observed 
by the CIPIH, patents only work in sector for the development of products for profitable markets; 
they don’t when potential consumers are poor. 
 
95 The requirements for acquiring a utility model ‘are less stringent than for patents. While the 
requirement of “novelty” is always to be met, that of “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” may 
be much lower or absent altogether. In practice, protection for utility models is often sought for 
innovations of an incremental character’ (WIPO at 
www.wipo.org/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/). Utility models are generally granted without 
prior examination and the term of protection is shorter than that of patents. 
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induce local and foreign companies to make genuine contributions to the state of the art 
in order to gain the monopolistic position conferred by a patent. 
 
 Duration of rights 
 
The TRIPS Agreement and some international conventions stipulate minimum terms for 
IPRs. Countries, as suggested above, may opt to extend such terms. From a 
development perspective, however, it would seem logical to keep the exclusive rights as 
short as possible in order to make available the subject matter available for use without 
authorization or compensation. 
 
In the area of copyright, for instance, the rights last for a very long period post mortem 
auctoris.  A sound option is to grant the minimum term required by the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Berne Convention96. In the last twenty years, however, the term of 
protection has expanded in many countries. Prof. Boyle has noted in this regard that 
 
copyright term limits are now absurdly long. The most recent retrospective 
extensions, to a term which already offered 99% of the value of a perpetual 
copyright, had the practical effect of helping a tiny number of works that are still 
in print, or in circulation. Estimates are between 1% and 4%. Yet in order to 
confer this monopoly benefit on a handful of works, works that the public had 
already “paid for” with a copyright term that must have been acceptable to the 
original author and publisher, they deny the public access to the remaining 96% 
of copyrighted works that otherwise would be passing into the public domain97. 
 
The minimum term for patents is, in accordance with article 34 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 20 years from the date of filing. Some free trade agreements include 
provisions requiring the extension of such a term (generally for up to five years) to 
compensate the title-holder for delays in the examination of the patent application or in 
                                                 
96 The general term of protection is the life of the author and fifty years after his death. In the 
case of works that belong to a juridical person, the term is fifty years (from the end of the 
calendar year of authorized publication, or, failing such authorized publication within 
50 years from the making of the work, 50 years from the end of the calendar year of making the 
work). See article 7 of the Berne Convention and article 12 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
97 Boyle, J. (2004) ‘A Manifesto on WIPO and the future of intellectual property’, Duke Law & 
Technology Review, No. 9, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/artículos/PDF/2004DLTR0009.pdf.  
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the marketing approval of a pharmaceutical product. These are clearly TRIPS-plus 
provisions that make the public pay for inefficiencies in the administration. The 
extension of the patent term for administrative delays may be abused since the title-
holder, who will benefit from a longer monopoly, may deliberately delay the applicable 
procedures. For the same reasons, it may also favor corruption within the 
administration. 
 
In the case of trademarks, the Agreement ensures that they would be indefinitely 
renewable, provided that they are used within given periods. 
 
 Exceptions to exclusive rights 
 
Independently of how broadly or narrowly the subject matter of protection is defined, 
national laws may, consistently with the TRIPS Agreement, provide for various 
exceptions to the exclusive rights granted by IPRs. 
 
All kinds of IPRs may be subject to the principle of international exhaustion of rights, in 
accordance to which parallel imports, that is, the importation of protected products 
without the consent of the title-holder, are permissible. Parallel imports may allow the 
acquisition of inputs for local production, as well as products for final consumption, at 
prices lower than those charged domestically by the patent owner or his licensees. 
Occasionally it has been argued that parallel imports may disadvantage local production 
and that a prohibition thereof would be consistent with policies encouraging local 
production. This reasoning is flawed, since when a product is patented in a given 
country only the patent owner (or the persons authorized by him)98 has the right to 
commercialize it, including through local production or importation. Hence, prohibiting 
parallel imports only means that the patent owner is given the power to charge prices 
that may be higher than those applied in other countries for the same products. 
 
In the area of copyright, the legality of possible exceptions to exclusive rights is 
controlled by the three-step test contained in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and 
article13 of the TRIPS Agreement. While the scope of the allowed exceptions is subject 
                                                 
98 The case of compulsory licenses will be further discussed below. 
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to interpretation99, there is no doubt that said provisions permit national laws to exempt 
a number of acts such as: 
 
- use of a work for informational, scientific, and educational purposes; 
 
-“minor” reservation in respect of performing, recitation, broadcasting, recording and 
cinematographic rights;  
 
-the use of copyright works in broadcasts; 
 
- reproduction of works  
 
1. for personal use;  
2. for quotations and citations;  
3. by libraries and archives for storage and replacement;  
4. for ephemeral recordings;  
5.. on current events for informatory purposes by the press; 
6. consisting of official texts and their translations, political speeches and speeches 
delivered in the course of legal proceedings100. 
 
Some exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, allowed under article 30 
of the TRIPS Agreement, may also be important to promote competition follow-on 
innovation, and transfer of technology.  
 
                                                 
99 A group of experts (comprised of academics and practitioners) convened by the Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and the School of Law at Queen Mary (London) recently 
concluded that  
 the current definition and interpretation of the three-step test by European national courts and 
the WTO was incomplete or inaccurate. They suggested that the ‘Three-Step Test should be 
interpreted in a 
manner that respects the legitimate interests of third parties, including  
• interests deriving from human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
• interests in competition, notably on secondary markets; and 
• other public interests, notably in scientific progress and cultural, social, or economic 
development” (Uma Suthersanen 2008, A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda: Time to List 
the “Public Domain”, ICTSD, Policy Brief No.1 Series, Geneva, available at 
http://ictsd.net/i/publications/37142/. 
 
100 See, e.g., Ruth Okediji (2005), The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions 
and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries in the Digital Environment, 
available at www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Okediji_Copyright_2005.pdf. 
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The exception known as ‘early working’ (or ‘Bolar exception’) allows a company to 
conduct the procedures for the approval of a generic version of a patented product 
before the expiry of a third party’s patent. This exception is of particular importance for 
public health policies, as it permits the early entry of generic competitors that drives the 
prices of medicines down. The TRIPS validity of the exception, as provided for in 
Canadian law, was challenged by the European Communities. The Canadian 
government has expressed in this connection that 
 
Finding the right balance between creators and users of IP, as the pace of 
technological change in Canadian and global marketplaces accelerates, has 
proven to be a continuing process of domestic consultation and legislative 
revision. Canada has utilised the flexibility provided for in the TRIPS 
Agreement to create an exception whereby a patent can be worked by anyone 
seeking regulatory approval for the product. This "early working" can only be in 
relation to that regulatory approval. Canada's successful defence of the "early 
working" or regulatory exception at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body validates 
a fundamental element of our patent regime. In the pharmaceutical industry, it 
has been demonstrated that this exception accelerates the market access of 
generic drugs by a period of 3 to 6.5 years (the average time required to prepare 
for and complete the regulatory approval process for a generic drug)101. 
 
                                                 
101 WT/WGTTT/2, 9 October 2002, Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology,  
Technology transfer - The Canadian experience. Communication from the Government of 
Canada, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/WT-WGTTT-2-en.pdf, para. 13. 
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Of more general application may be what is known as the ‘experimentation’ or 
‘research’ exception102. It provides a defence to any person that uses a patented 
invention to test it, for instance, to establish the validity of the respective patent, to 
request a license or to improve on the patented technology. If broadly conceived, so as 
to include both commercial and non-commercial purposes, this exception creates a 
space for ‘inventing around’ patented inventions and follow-on innovations. Of course, 
countries with a developed innovation system may benefit more from this exception than 
those with weak innovative capacities, but even if the exception could be use in rare 
occasions in the latter, as the technological base of the country upgrades, increased use of 
the exception is likely. 
 
 Compulsory licenses 
 
Compulsory licenses constitute an important flexibility for countries willing to address 
various public needs, such as access to cultural expressions, national emergencies, anti-
competitive practices, excessive pricing and other abuses of IPRs holders. With the 
exception of trademarks103, such licenses may be provided for in relation to any title of 
IPRs104.  
 
In the field of copyright, national laws provide for a broad range of compulsory 
licenses, for instance, for the public broadcasting of artistic performances. They can also 
be conferred (albeit under certain limitative conditions) for the translation or 
reproduction of copyrighted work in developing countries105. 
 
                                                 
102 For an analysis of comparative law on the subject see C Correa, The International 
Dimension of the Research Exception, SIPPI Project, AAAS, Washington D. C., available at 
http://sippi.aaas.org/intlexemptionpaper.shtml, 2005 (last visited 30 November, 2007). 
 
103 Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement bans compulsory licenses in the case of trademarks (‘...it 
being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted…’). 
 
104 In the case of patents and designs (topographies) of integrated circuits ‘a compulsory license 
shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive’ (article 31, TRIPS Agreement). 
105 See the Appendix to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 
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During the XIX Century and in line with the Paris Convention (as amended in 1925), 
many countries introduced the possibility of granting a compulsory license106 in cases of 
lack or insufficient exploitation of a patent in the country of grant. This provision was in 
tune with the then dominant idea that patents had to be conceived as a vehicle for 
technology transfer and a tool to promote industrialization. In the negotiation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, developed countries tried hard to eliminate the possibility of 
granting compulsory licenses on those grounds, but a compromise deal around article 
27.1 of the Agreement kept it open107.  
Although the USA108 and some commentators have read article 27.1 in the sense that it 
precludes the grant of compulsory licenses for lack of exploitation of a patent, an 
interpretation in accordance with articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties suggests that such licenses are TRIPS consistent109. 
The USA is probably the country where the largest number of compulsory licenses has 
been granted, namely to remedy anti-competitive practices and in exercising 
government’s power to use any patented invention for non-commercial purposes110. 
Moreover, the US Clean Air Act 1988 42 USC Sec. 7608) 111 specifically provides for 
                                                 
106 Some patent laws, such as the French law of 1844, provided for more drastic remedies: a 
patent could be revoked in case of lack of local exploitation. The Paris Convention did not 
disallow revocation in these cases, but made it conditional upon failure of a prior compulsory 
license. See article 5A of the Convention.  
107 Article 27.1: "…patent rights shall be enjoyable without discrimination...whether the products 
are imported or locally produced". 
108 In January 2001, the US brought a complaint against Brazil arguing that the Brazilian law’s 
authorization to grant compulsory licenses when patents were not worked was TRIPS-
inconsistent (Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by the United States, January 9, 2001, WT/DS199/3). However, the US withdrew the 
complaint before a panel was established. Without prejudice to their respective positions, the 
United States and Brazil agreed to enter into bilateral discussions before Brazil makes use of 
Article 68 against a U.S. patent holder (Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1, July 19, 2001). 
109 See e.g., C Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries?  in International public goods and transfer of technology under a globalized 
intellectual property regime, Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (editors), Cambridge 
Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
110 See, e.g. Reichmann, J. and Hasenzahl, C. (2003) "Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: 
Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada”, 
ICTSD, available at  
www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/Dialogues/2007-05-03/Section%20Final%20Toolkit/Annex%20D-%20. 
 
111 § 7608. Mandatory licensing: Whenever the Attorney General determines, upon application 
of the Administrator— (1) that—  
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‘mandatory licensing’ when a patented invention is not available for the implementation 
of some of the Act’s requirements.112. Further, the United States Energy 
Storage Competitiveness Act of 2007 created a system of compulsory licenses for 
energy storage technologies. In a number of decisions issued in the last five years, the 
US Supreme Court and lower courts have decided the judicial grant of compulsory 
licenses of patents based on equity considerations113.  
Some developing countries (e.g., Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia) have granted in 
the last ten years compulsory licenses or authorized the government use of a number of 
patents relating to pharmaceuticals, notably anti-retrovirals114. 
 Technology transfer 
Finally, transfer of technology and its impact on industrialization may be influenced by 
the contractual conditions under which such transfer takes place. As noted above, 
licensing agreements generally contain restrictive clauses. They may limit economies of 
scale (e.g. when exports are forbidden), discourage improvements on the technology 
received (e.g. grant-back provisions), limit the field of use of the technology (field-of-
use restrictions) or otherwise constrain the productive, technical or commercial 
activities of the licensee. Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the States’ 
                                                                                                                                               
(A) in the implementation of the requirements of section 7411, 7412, or 7521 of this title, a right 
under any United States letters patent, which is being used or intended for public or commercial 
use and not otherwise reasonably available, is necessary to enable any person required to 
comply with such limitation to so comply, and  
(B) there are no reasonable alternative methods to accomplish such purpose, and  
(2) that the unavailability of such right may result in a substantial lessening of competition or 
tendency to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country,  
the Attorney General may so certify to a district court of the United States, which may issue an 
order requiring the person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable terms and 
conditions as the court, after hearing, may determine. Such certification may be made to the 
district court for the district in which the person owning the patent resides, does business, or is 
found.  
 
112 The US Atomic Energy Act 1988 (42 USC Sec. 2183) also provides for compulsory licenses 
in specific cases. 
 
113 See eBAY INC. et al v. MERCEXCHANGE No. 05-130; 401 F. 3d 1323, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf.  
114 See, e.g., Cecilia Oh, ‘Compulsory licences: Recent experiences in Developing Countries’, 
International Journal of Intellectual Property Management, vol. 1, No 1 
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right to control such practices but limits to some extent the governments’ room in 
defining and condemning them115.  
 
Many developing countries adopted specific regulations on technology transfer in the 
1970’s (imposing controls on restrictive practices, royalty payments, guarantees, law 
and jurisdiction) but most of such regulations have been derogated or significantly 
weakened. This is paradoxical, on the one hand, because developed countries apply 
their competition laws to restrictive practices in licensing agreements and, on the other, 
because such regulations seems more necessary now than in the past, when developing 
countries were able to apply more relaxed IPRs regimes and their bargaining position to 
obtain better terms and conditions with technology owners was eventually stronger116. 
 
Limiting TRIPS flexibilities 
 
While the TRIPS Agreement leaves, as examined above, a number of flexibilities that 
may be used by countries willing to upgrade their technological capabilities, a number 
of FTAs and other bilateral agreements have significantly limited the available options. 
Thus, in the area of copyright such agreements require the establishment of strict TPMs 
and anti-circumvention measures and extend the term of protection beyond the 
requirement under the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. In the area of 
patents, some agreements impose extensions of the patent term to compensate for 
administrative delays in the examination of patent applications and in the marketing 
approval of a pharmaceutical product, and limit the grounds for the grant of compulsory 
licenses117. They also significantly enhance enforcement obligations. These are only a 
few examples, as the number of TRIPS-plus provisions on different aspects of IPRs are 
                                                 
115 See P. Roffe and C. Spennemann (2008), Control of Anti-competitive Practices in 
Contractual Licenses under the TRIPS Agreement, in C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual 
property and international trade. The TRIPS Agreement , Kluwer Law International, London, 
second edition. 
116  Royalty payments for foreign technologies have substantially increased in some countries. 
Thus, chinese royalty payments multiplied by ten between 1997 and 2005 (see 
http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=eco_roy_and_lic_fee_pay_bop_cur_us-fees-
payments-bop-current-us&country=ch-china). 
117 Such as in the case of Jordan and Sri Lanka. However, the FTAs signed after the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health did not contain such a limitation. 
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numerous and substantially elevate the protection afforded in the signatory countries, in 
some cases even beyond what is available in the USA118. 
 
Issues relating to innovation and transfer of technology have arisen in bilateral treaties 
involving IPRs. For instance, the Andean countries attempted to include certain 
provisions on transfer of technology in the FTA they negotiated with the USA. What 
they obtained is very modest. The US FTA with Peru, for instance, only contains in 
article 16.12 (‘Promotion of Innovation and Technological Development’) very general 
commitments about ‘science and technology cooperation’. The commitment to identify 
areas for such cooperation and, as appropriate, engage in collaborative’ projects is 
limited to ‘ scientific research’ (paragraph 1), while  ‘[A]ny such collaborative activities 
or transfer of technology shall be based on mutually agreed terms’ (paragraph 2).  
CARIFORUM countries obtained, in their negotiations with the EU of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) a broader set of commitments on innovation and 
technology transfer. The objectives of the chapter on ‘Innovation and intellectual 
property’ are quite ambitious (see Box 2)  
     Box 2 





Article 132. Objectives 
The objectives of this Chapter are to: 
(a) promote the process of innovation, including eco-innovation, of enterprises located 
in the Parties; 
(b) foster competitiveness of enterprises and in particular micro, small and medium-
                                                 
118 See Frederick Abbott (2006), Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law, UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Februar, Issue Paper No. 12),  Geneva. 
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sized enterprises of the Parties; 
(c) facilitate the production and commercialization of innovative and creative products 
between the Parties; 
(d) achieve an adequate and effective level of protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; 
(e) contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology and know-how;  
(f) encourage, develop and facilitate cooperative research and development activities in 
science and technology between the Parties, as well as to develop lasting relations 
between the Parties’ scientific communities. 
(g) encourage, develop and facilitate cooperative production and development activities 
in the creative industries between the Parties, as well as to develop lasting relationships 
between the Parties creative communities. 
(h) promote and strengthen regional cooperative activities involving the outermost 
regions of the European Community, so as to allow these regions and the 
CARIFORUM States to mutually benefit from their neighbourhood situation by 
developing an innovative and competitive regional area. 
The CARIFORUM-EPA contains a number of commitments regarding the participation 
in ‘framework programmes’ (article 134), cooperation in the area of competitiveness 
and innovation (Article 135) and on science and technology (Article 136). Of particular 
interest is article 142 on ‘Transfer of Technology’. Its paragraph 3 reads:  
The EC Party shall facilitate and promote the use of incentives granted to 
institutions and enterprises in their territories for the transfer of technology to 
institutions and enterprises of the CARIFORUM States in order to enable the 
CARIFORUM States to establish a viable technological base. The EC Party 
shall endeavour to bring any known measures to the attention of the 
CARIFORUM EC Trade and Development Committee for discussion and 
review. 
This provision extends the obligation to confer incentives for the transfer of technology 
to all CARICORUM States. It represents a step forward in relation to article 66.2 of the 
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TRIPS Agreement, as the latter only applies in connection with Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs)119. 
 
4. International governance of the IPRs system 
 
The birth and development of the IPRs system was marked by the principle of 
territoriality. This means that validity and enforceability of IPRs is, with some 
exceptions, limited to the territory of the country where the right is granted or 
recognized. That principle reflects the importance of the national dimension in the 
design of IPRs laws. 
 
Notwithstanding the weight of the national dimension in IPRs policy making, in the last 
twenty years there has been a growing intervention of regional and international 
organizations in norm- setting in this area and some limited outcomes in the process of 
harmonization of IPRs laws.  
 
As indicated in Table 1, a large number of conventions have been signed since the end 
of the XVIII Century.  
 
Table 1 
Main international conventions on IPRs120 
                                                 
119 See Sisule Musungu, (2008), Innovation and Intellectual Property in the EC-CARIFORUM 
EPA: Lessons for other ACP Regions. A Study Commissioned by GTZ, p. 12-13. 
 
120 The IPRs treaties signed are the following: 
 
1. Berne- Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as 
amended on September 28, 1979; 
2. Brussels- Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite adopted at Brussels on May 21, 1974; 
3. Budapest- Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms 
for the Purposes of Patent Procedure as amended, October 1, 2002) 
4. Geneva Phonogram- Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, of October 29, 1971;  
5. Hague- The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial 
Designs of November 6, 1925; 
6. Lisbon- Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration of October 31, 1958, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 
1967, and as amended on September 28, 1979 
7. Locarno- Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial 
Designs, as amended on September 28, 1979 
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Period Main international conventions  
 




1960-1970 Rome 1961 
UPOV 1961 
Lisbon 1967 
Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970  
Geneva 1971 
Brussels 1974  
Budapest 1977 
                                                                                                                                               
8. Madrid - Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods, as of 1967; 
9. Madrid- Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks of April 14, 
1891, as last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 and amended on September 
28, 1979 
10. Madrid Protocol- Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks, adopted at Madrid on June 27, 1989  
11. Nice- Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services 
for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of June 15, 1957, as amended on 
September 28, 1979 
12. Paris- Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as 
last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on September 28, 
1979 
13. PCT- Patent Cooperation Treaty, as in force from January 1, 2004; 
14. Rome- International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, October 26, 1961;  
15. Strasbourg- Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification of March 
24, 1971, as amended on September 28, 1979; 
16. TLT-Trademark Law Treaty adopted at Geneva on October 27, 1994 
17. UPOV- International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of 
December 2, 1961, as Revised at Geneva on November 10, 1972, on October 23, 
1978, and on March 19, 1991  
18. Vienna- Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the 
Figurative Elements of Marks, as amended on October 1, 1985; 
19. Washington -Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 
adopted at Washington on May 26, 1989  
20. WCT- WIPO Copyright Treaty and Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty December 20, 1996; 
21. WPPT- WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and Agreed Statements 
Concerning the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (adopted in Geneva 






1990-2000 TRIPS 1994 
Trademark Law 1994 
WIPO Copyright 1996 
WIPO Performers-Phonograms 1996 
Patent Law 2000 
 
 




At the end of the XIX Century two ground-breaking international conventions were 
adopted: the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (1983) and the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). The Madrid 
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods 
was also adopted in that period (1891).  
After several decades with little normative activity (except for the revisions of the Paris 
Convention) a new and strong impetus to the international IPRs system appeared in the 
1960’s and 1970s, with the adoption of several important instruments: the Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (1961), the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (1961), the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of 
Appellations of Origin and their International Registration (1967), the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (1970), the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (1971), the 
Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite (1974) and the Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 
(1977). Of particular relevance in the patent area was the adoption of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, which facilitates the international registration of patents in 136 
countries. 
 
During the seventies, and in the context of new perspectives on development, 
developing countries aimed at reversing the trend towards the expansion of IPRs and 
proposed a revision of the Paris Convention. One of the main goals of the revision was 
to amend article 5A in order to promote the use of  patented inventions in the countries 
of registration121. However, not only this initiative failed, but developed countries took 
the offensive again and proposed a new and ambitious instrument in the framework of 
GATT which eventually led to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement (1994), followed 
by the Trademark Law Treaty (1994), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996), the WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (1996) and the Patent Law Treaty (2000).  
 
                                                 
121 See Roffe, P. and Tesfachew, T. (2001), International Technology Transfer. The origins and 
aftermaths of the United Nations Negotoations on a Draft Code of Conduct, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, p. 388 
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This new wave of international agreements confirmed, as noted by Coriat, that the move 
towards trade liberalization and an increasingly intensive usage of knowledge in all 
spheres of human activity was ‘accompanied by a heretofore unrecognized rise in “entry 
barriers” that impede access to knowledge’122.  
 
From the early 1990s, various Directives have harmonized several areas of IPRs in the 
European Union, notably trademarks, and some aspects of copyright (mainly scope and 
duration of copyright protection) and design law. More recently agreements were 
reached in the area of enforcement123. EU legislative activity in this area has shown how 
difficult has been to harmonize substantive or procedural IPRs rules at the European 
level. Thus, the establishment of an ‘European patent’ has not been agreed upon yet 
despite many years of negotiations,  and two of the latest directives (on the Resale right 
2001/84/EC and the Information Society, 2001/29/EC) took between 4 and 5 years to be 
approved.  
 
There have also been processes of harmonization in other regions, such as in the case of 
the Andean Community, where ‘common regimes’ on industrial property, copyright and 
PVP have been adopted. French speaking African countries have harmonized patent law 
under the Organisation African de Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI). 
 
Interestingly, where harmonization has succeeded at the regional level, the principle of 
territoriality has been preserved. Even the most ambitious piece of international law on 
the subject, the TRIPS Agreement, has kept that principle. 
 
With the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO has taken a central role in the 
governance of IPRs. Not only said Agreement has established minimum standards in 
most fields of IPRs, but the possible application of trade retaliations against non-
compliant countries, in accordance with the Dispute settlement Understanding, has 
increased the enforceability of international obligations in a way that was unknown 
                                                 
122 Coriat, Benjamin (2002), The new global intellectual property rights regime and its imperial 
dimension. Implications for “North/South” relations, Paper prepared for the 50th BNDS 
Anniversary Seminar Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, September. 
123 Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC. 
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under the pre-TRIPS conventions124. The activities of the Council for TRIPS have 
allowed Members to monitor other Members’ legislation on IPRs and address other 
issues, such as the relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
TRIPS Agreement and the establishment of an international registry for certain 
geographical indications. The Council also addressed, upon instruction of the Doha 
Ministerial Conference125, the use of compulsory licenses to supply medicines to 
countries without manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector126. After a 
decision was adopted on this matter, the Council seems to have entered into a stage of 
quasi- paralysis. Disagreement on pending issues persists, while any new initiatives find 
considerable resistance from WTO Membership. In October 2005 the European 
Communities and their Member States proposed the TRIPS Council to review 
enforcement of obligations under the TRIPS to find ways to help fight problems of 
piracy and counterfeiting127. While several developed countries such as the United 
States and Japan showed general support for this proposal, many developing countries 
voiced strong opposition128. On their side, developing countries took the offensive in the 
WTO to amend the TRIPS Agreement129 through the inclusion of a new provision 
requiring patent applicants to disclose the origin of genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge covered in patent applications130. The USA has vehemently 
                                                 
124 Several complaints have been submitted under the DSU in relation to TRIPS. See Mohamed 
Gad,. (2008), TRIPS Dispute Settlement and Developing Country Interests, , in C. Correa and 
A. Yusuf, Intellectual property and international trade. The TRIPS Agreement , Kluwer Law 
International, London, second edition. 
125 See paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
126 See WTO Decision of 30 August 2003, and the proposed amendment (incorporation of 
article 31bis) to the TRIPS Agreement, still subject to approval by WTO Members. 
127 One of the main reasons why developed countries possibly brought to the TRIPS Council the 
enforcement issue, was developing countries’ resistance against developing TRIPS-plus 
standards at WIPO’s Advisory Committee on Enforcement. This Committee was created on the 
condition that norm setting would be excluded from its mandate. 
128 See ‘TRIPS Council Issues Still Alive For WTO Ministerial’, Intellectual Property Watch, 28 
October 2005, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=123 (last visited 2 
March, 2008).  
129 The proposal (WT/GC/W/564/Rev. 2) originally made by India, Brazil, Peru and other 
developing countries has been formally endorsed by  the Africa Group, the LDC Group and the 
ACP Group. See Martin Khor (2008), TRIPS: majority of WTO members now support disclosure 
proposal, SUNS #6436 17 March 2008, available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2008/twn.ipr.info.080307.htm.  
130 See, e.g., Joshua Sarnoff  and Carlos Correa (2006), Analysis of Options for Implementing  
Disclosure of Origin Requirements in Intellectual Property Applications. A contribution to 
UNCTAD’s response to the invitation of the Seventh Conference of the Parties of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva. 
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objected to this proposal which may still be subject to negotiation in the context of the 
Millennium Round. 
Upon demand by developing countries, the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference (2001) 
established a Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology in order to address 
developing countries’ concerns about the slow flow of technology to their economies. 
Developing countries noted, at the Working Group, that most provisions in WTO 
agreements relating to transfer of technology were of "best endeavor" nature rather than 
binding obligations, and that they should be made operational. Developed countries, 
however, have argued that the WTO provisions were underpinned by several priorities 
such as integrating countries into world trade, protecting IPRs, increasing the flow of 
investment and promoting sustainable development. They also observed that some of 
these provisions identified technical assistance, training, provision of information and 
other forms of developmental cooperation as the principle means of promoting Transfer 
of Technology TOT. They were reluctant to introduce any negotiating aspect into the 
Working Group131. Further, developed countries opposed to a discussion of transfer of 
technology issues in the context of the TRIPS Agreement, as there was a specialized 
Council (Council for TRIPS) to deal with that matter132. The Working Group has been 
unable to reach any of the objectives that motivated its establishment. 
As indicated in Table 1, since year 2000 WIPO has been unable to bring to conclusion 
any new convention, in spite of the efforts made by the Secretariat and some developed 
countries. An important reason for this has been the growing unease of developing 
countries with the unqualified pro-IPRs approach adopted by WIPO Secretariat. 
Developing countries have blocked in the last five years at least two important IPRs-
expanding initiatives sponsored by WIPO: 
 
                                                 
131 See Report of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the General 
Council. Geneva, World Trade Organization, WT/WGTTT/5, 14 July 2003. 
132 A communication by a group of countries to the Working Group identified the following 
agreements as having an influence on transfer of technology: the TRIPS Agreement, the 
Agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the 
GATS Annex on Telecommunications, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) (Provisions Relating to Transfer of Technology in WTO Agreements. 
Communication from Cuba, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Revision. Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology, 
WT/WGTTT/3/Rev.1). 
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-the Substantive Patent Law Treaty proposed by developed countries to harmonize 
critical aspects of patent law, such as the patentability requirements133; 
 
-a proposed new treaty on the protection of broadcasting and cablecasting organizations 
134.  
 
Developing countries have also been critical about the bias of the technical assistance 
provided by WIPO Secretariat, which has been generally delivered with a pro-IPRs 
approach and little or nothing of a pro-development dimension. On the basis of a 
proposal for a ‘Development Agenda for WIPO’ presented at the 2004 WIPO General 
Assembly135, a first set of proposals to change the paradigm under which WIPO works 
was approved in September 2007 by the WIPO General Assembly. The proposals refer, 
inter alia, to technical assistance, access to knowledge, evaluation and impact studies 
and governance. A new WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property 
(CDIP) has been established. One of the objectives of the Development Agenda is to 
implement the requirement that WIPO undertakes development impact assessments 
before engaging its members in new norm setting-initiatives. 
 
In view of the situation in WTO and WIPO, developed countries and their business 
associations have opted to actively engage in bilateral dealings and in ‘forum shopping’ 
in order to pursue an agenda of expansion and strengthening of IPRs protection.  
 
As mentioned, a number of free trade agreements (FTAs) that contain TRIPS-plus 
standards of IPRs protection have been negotiated or signed since 2000. Such 
agreements have allowed developed countries to obtain concessions on a bilateral basis 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Carlos Correa and Sisule Musungu (2002), The WIPO Patent Agenda: the risks for 
developing countries, Working Paper No. 12, South Centre, Geneva, available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wipopatent/toc.htm; Carlos Correa (2004), The WIPO 
draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty: a review of selected provisions, Working Paper 17, South 
Centre, Geneva, available at www.southcentre.org/publications/workingpapers/wp17.pdf. 
 
134 See Viviana Muñoz Tellez and Andrew Chege Waitara (2007), A development analysis of 
the proposed WIPO treaty on the protection of broadcasting and cablecasting organizations, 
South Centre, Geneva, available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/researchpapers/ResearchPapers9.pdf. 
135 The proposal was submitted by Argentina and Brazil, and co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Venezuela, for the establishment of a development agenda for WIPO (WIPO document 
WO/GA/31/11). 
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that were unlikely to be reached in a multilateral framework where, as noted, 
developing countries have become increasingly reluctant to support a further elevation 
of IPRs standards136. 
 
In looking for more friendly fora than WIPO and WTO for a further expansion and 
strengthening of IPRs standards, developed countries have attempted to mobilize other 
international organizations with no mandate to work in the area of IPRs.   
 
The World Customs Organisation (WCO) launched an initiative to issue norms that 
would expand the application of border measures beyond what is required under the 
TRIPS Agreement. WCO has promoted the adoption of Provisional Standards 
Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE). The WCO also 
elaborated ‘Model provisions for national legislation to implement fair and effective 
border measures consistent with the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights’137.The purpose of these ‘model provisions’ is  
 
to provide national authorities in charge of the preparation and modernisation of 
customs and/or intellectual property legislation worldwide with 
recommendations for the implementation of border measures for the protection 
of intellectual property rights. This guide is intended both for authorities that are 
introducing border measures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) for the first time as well as for those that are conducting or considering 
legislative reviews or reforms. 
 
The WCO model provisions are deliberately aimed at surpassing the TRIPS standards. 
WCO argues that  
 
                                                 
136 WIPO document WO/GA/31/11, 27 August, 2004, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf.  
 
137 See William New (2008), World Customs Organization Recommends Far-Reaching New 
Rules On IP, Intellectual Property Watch, 28 February, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=939.  
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The experience of customs administrations in numerous countries has indicated, 
however, that only by granting certain powers and measures that go beyond the 
minimum requirement set forth in the TRIPs Agreement, Governments can 
provide an effective and efficient level of IPR protection and enforcement at 
their borders138. 
 
Interestingly, the intervention and effective coordination of developing countries 
prevented the adoption of the SECURE draft at the 2008 WCO Council; later, at the 
WCO Policy Commission in December 2008, it was decided to suspend the SECURE 
Working Group139.  
 
Another illustration of forum shopping is an initiative on counterfeiting channeled 
through the Universal Postal Union (UPU), a UN forum for the cooperation among 
postal authorities. As part of a global offensive by developed countries to enhance 
the enforcement mechanisms of IPRs, a draft Resolution was introduced for 
approval in 2008 urging postal authorities to act in cases of ‘counterfeiting’. One of 
the operative paragraphs of the Resolution ‘[U]rges UPU member countries in the 
context of national legislation to encourage their postal administrations to:..take all 
reasonable and practical measures to support Customs in their role of identifying 
counterfeit and pirated items in the postal network’. Based on a presentation by a 
number of developing countries, the draft resolution was amended in the sense the 
determination of counterfeit items was the responsibility of ‘relevant national 
authorities, in accordance with national legislation’140. 
 
                                                 
138 See http://www.wcoipr.org/wcoipr/gfx/ModelLawfinal.doc (last visited 20 June 2008). 
 
139 However, the WCO Secretariat has recommended to the Policy Commission that a 
new body be set up under a Permanent Technical Committee or the Enforcement Committee to 
develop practical means of supporting customs administrations in conducting IPR-related 
controls. See Xuan Li, WCO SECURE: Lessons Learnt From the Abortion Of the TRIP-Plus-





140 The original draft stated that "that the Customs and experts on intellectual property 
rights are primarily responsible for determining whether an item is counterfeit". 
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The World Health Organization (WHO) has also been actively engaged in discussions 
on IPRs following two different tracks. 
 
On the one hand, in 2006 an ‘International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting 
Taskforce’ (IMPACT) was set up in the framework of WHO, upon an initiative of large 
pharmaceutical companies and some developed countries’ governments. The aim of 
IMPACT is to contribute to the fight against counterfeiting of medicines141. IMPACT 
has developed a problematic definition of ‘counterfeit’ products, which is currently 
under review, which confuses public health (e.g. substandard or spurious medicines) 
with IPRs violations. 
 
On the other, pursuant to several resolutions of the World Health Assembly142, WHO 
engaged in the debate about the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health. The 
Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), set up by 
the WHO Assembly in 2004, produced the already referred to report containing a 
number of recommendations, including on the use of TRIPS flexibilities. In order to 
implement such recommendations, an Intergovernmental Working Group on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (the “WHO IGWG”)143   was subsequently 
established, which proposed a "Global strategy and plan of action on public health, 
innovation and intellectual property" adopted by Resolution 2008 (WHA61). Unlike the 
other interventions in international organizations mentioned above (including WHO-
IMPACT), developed countries have not generally supported WHO involvement in 
                                                 
141 See www.who.int/impact (last visited 15 June 2008). 
 
142  The following resolutions mandated WHO to monitor the implications of trade agreements 
on public health and requested other studies on innovation and public health: 
 
1996 (WHA 49.14) requesting WHO to study and inform on the impact of WTO on 
medicines 
 
 1999 (WHA52.19): Revised Drug Strategy 
 2001 (WHA54.11): Revised Drug Strategy  
 2002 (WHA55.14): Ensuring accessibility of essential medicines 
 2003 (WHA56.27): Intellectual property rights, innovation and public health 
 2006 (WHA59.24): Public health, innovation, essential health research and IPR: 
towards a global strategy and plan of action 
 2007 (WHA60.30): Public health, innovation and intellectual property 
 
143 WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property, A/PHI/IGWG/2/2 (31 July 2007). 
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deliberations on IPRs and public health144. WHO, however, has made a number of 
publications and provides technical assistance and training on the subject145. 
 
The resistance by developing countries to engage in multilateral negotiations for the 
enhancement of IPRs protection has led developed countries to initiate the negotiation 
of an ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (ACTA) outside WIPO and WTO, The 
envisioned ACTA would include commitments in three areas: (1) strengthening 
international cooperation; (2) improving enforcement practices; and (3) providing a 
strong legal framework for IP enforcement. Negotiations have been conducted in a 
secretive manner146. A text of the draft ACTA is not publicly available yet. 
 
5. Main conclusions 
 
IPRs regimes have evolved in developed countries in harmony with their economic and 
technological progress. The arguments about the need for global and higher standards of 
IPRs protection tend to ignore the lessons from history and the instrumental nature of 
such rights. The recognition of IPRs is not a matter of natural justice or moral rewards. 
Those arguments often overlook that, by its very nature, knowledge is a public good, 
and that limitations to free access thereto need to be socially and economically justified 
in the particular context where they are bound to apply. The available evidence clearly 
suggests that the role of IP significantly varies according, inter alia, with per capita 
income, productive structures, levels of technological development and States’ policies.  
 
IPRs by their very design, reduce static efficiency and thereby society’s welfare, in 
order to generate, in theory, dynamic efficiency through promoting future innovation. 
This is not, however, an automatic and inevitable outcome. The granting of exclusive 
                                                 
144 For instance, the US opposed to discussions on TRIPS flexibilities in the context of the 
IGWG: “Accordingly, the IGWG should not consider Subsection (a) of Paragraph Six of the 
document.  The WHO Secretariat should not expand its work on matters better addressed by 
another international organization.  Therefore, the IGWG should not consider Subsections (f) 
and (i) of Paragraph Six of the document, because they more appropriately fit within the scope 
and mandate of the WTO and WIPO’ (US COMMENTS to the WHO ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL 
STRATEGY, 2006, p. 5). 
145 See http://www.who.int/phi/documents/en/. 
146 The European Parliament passed a resolution in March 2009 demanding more transparency 




rights, particularly if they are broad or prevent the use of early research results, may 
retard innovation. Society may benefit if competitors could rapidly imitate and improve 
on the innovation so as to make it available at competitive prices. Most importantly, 
IPRs may generate losses in poor countries (e.g. restricting access to drugs) that cannot 
be compensated by hypothetical gains through future innovations. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement introduced a drastic change in IPRs design and implementation. 
It established minimum standards of protection that all WTO countries are obliged to 
comply with, thereby limiting the space available to developing countries for adapting 
their IPRs regimes to their own circumstances and needs. While such countries will not 
enjoy the freedom that developed countries had in their earlier stages of development to 
shape their IPRs regimes, they may use the flexibilities allowed by said Agreement to 
mitigate the possible negative implications of high standards of protection and to reap 
some potential benefits in specific areas (e.g. trademark protection, copyright of some 
local creations).  
 
Despite the tremendous achievement that the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
represented for developed countries, they have continued to demand further increases in 
IPRs protection. As such demands are unlikely to be viable in the WTO and WIPO, 
developed countries have strategically moved to bilateral negotiations and to other 
international organizations. With a weaker negotiation position than in multilateral fora, 
many developing countries have consented to additional obligations that further limit 
their capacity to shape their IPRs regimes.  
 
While a revision of the TRIPS Agreement based on development considerations would 
be desirable but difficult to achieve, as a minimum any further reform to international 
rules on IPRs should only be undertaken after a careful assessment of the development 
impact of the new proposed rules. This also applies, of course, to reforms envisaged in 
the context of bilateral or regional negotiations, which should ensure that they preserve 
the room available under said Agreement to introduce pro-development measures 
(including for the promotion of transfer of technology). Governments may be inclined 
to accept higher standards of IPRs in exchange for trade concessions in other fields. But 
they should be aware that IPRs rules may have an overarching impact on development, 
59 
and that the potential immediate trade benefits they may obtain may be offset by the 
long term impact of high IPRs standards of protection. 
 
